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Abstract
Suppose a principal in a cryptographic protocol creates and transmits a message containing a
new value v, later receiving v back in a di)erent cryptographic context. It can be concluded that
some principal possessing the relevant key has received and transformed the message in which v
was emitted. In some circumstances, this principal must be a regular participant of the protocol,
not the penetrator.
An inference of this kind is an authentication test. We introduce two main kinds of authenti-
cation test. An outgoing test is one in which the new value v is transmitted in encrypted form,
and only a regular participant can extract it from that form. An incoming test is one in which
v is received back in encrypted form, and only a regular participant can put it in that form. We
combine these two tests with a supplementary idea, the unsolicited test, and a related method
for checking that keys remain secret. Together, these techniques determine what authentication
properties are achieved by a wide range of cryptographic protocols.
In this paper we introduce authentication tests and prove their soundness. We illustrate their
power by giving new and straightforward proofs of security goals for several protocols. We also
illustrate how to use the authentication tests as a heuristic for /nding attacks against incorrect
protocols. Finally, we suggest a protocol design process.
We express these ideas in the strand space formalism (Thayer et al. J. Comput. Security 7
(1999) 191–230), which provides a convenient context to prove them correct. c© 2002 Elsevier
Science B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Cryptographic protocols; Authentication; Secrecy; Strand spaces; Bundles;
Cryptographic protocol design
1. Introduction
One reason why cryptographic protocol analysis is hard is that the attacker has so
many choices. He may apply a repertory of actions in any order to any message he
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observes, and he may submit the results in place of any legitimate message. In addition,
the attacker may initiate new sessions of the protocol, or await sessions initiated by
regular participants [7]. Consequently, even though cryptographic protocols are simple
/nite state activities in the absence of an attacker, the analysis of possible attacks is not
necessarily decidable; indeed, even if the protocols are restricted so that the problem
is decidable, it may not be tractable [3].
In this paper we use the strand space formalism [26] to restrict the order in which the
penetrator applies the operations available to him (Section 3). Anything the penetrator
can do at all, he can do carrying out operations in this restricted order. There are two
ingredients in the restriction, a normal form lemma (Section 3.2, Proposition 5), and
an eFciency condition (Section 3.6, Proposition 14). The normal form lemma is not
new [5, 3], although the eFciency condition appears to be.
The main novelty in this paper are some very simple-to-apply methods for authenti-
cation and secrecy results, which the penetrator restrictions justify. An important con-
sequence of the restrictions is that, for certain encrypted components of messages, the
penetrator cannot take any signi/cant action. Those components may be discarded, but
if they are delivered to a regular participant, they can only be delivered unaltered. Only
the regular participants can change these encrypted components in the way demanded
by the protocol.
Therefore this kind of component may be regarded as an authentication test com-
ponent: if the contents are later received in transformed form, then only a regu-
lar participant, not the penetrator, can have transformed them. In favorable circum-
stances, it can only be one regular participant, the intended one, who has thereby been
authenticated.
We embody these ideas in three authentication results (Section 4.2, Authentication
Tests 1–3). These results allow us to establish many authentication results without any
consideration of the dynamic execution of protocols, involving the activity of several
principals. Instead, it suFces to consider the forms of the possible behaviors of the
principals independently. We use the Needham–Schroeder–Lowe protocol [17, 13] in
explaining the ideas. In Section 5, we illustrate the authentication tests by proving the
authentication properties of some familiar protocols and identifying counter-examples
to others. The protocols we consider are from Otway and Rees [19], Neuman and
Stubblebine [18] and Woo and Lam [27, 29]. It is routine to apply the method to new
protocols, whether they use public keys or shared symmetric keys.
However, not every protocol can be veri/ed using these methods. In particular, for
the authentication theorems to apply, the protocol must not allow the authentications
tests to be proper sub-messages of other messages manipulated by the regular partic-
ipants. We end (Section 6) with a design process leading to protocols that not only
avoid this sort of nesting, but also concentrate the crucial parameters to be authenticated
in a small number of authentication test components.
The authentication tests themselves are easy to apply, but the proofs justifying them
are more complicated. We would compare the authentication tests to the interface to a
module; the implementation internal to the module is complex, but the interface makes
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it easy to use its services without worrying about the internals. For some purposes
it would be helpful to enlarge the interface. There are additional services, or ways
of drawing conclusions about authentication protocols, that the proof methods of Sec-
tions 3 and 4 can o)er. For instance, one addition would be to make explicit the order
in which events have occurred, which gives a convenient way to reason about whether
a key has been generated recently. An enrichment of the message algebra would ex-
plicitly model the way a key may be generated by hashing other values (as is used
e.g. in the SSL and TLS protocols [6]). However, the authentication tests currently
exported in Section 4 already apply to a wide range of protocols, and give a highly
intuitive explanation for why they are right, or where they go wrong.
The authentication tests, and some extensions, have been incorporated [21] into
Athena [23], an automated system for protocol analysis based on the strand space
model. Athena has been applied to large numbers of candidate protocols output by an
automated protocol generator. In one 2-h run, 11,000 candidates were /ltered, yielding
/ve successful protocols. Since the generator itself prunes protocols to avoid obvious
Iaws, this is a remarkable level of performance.
The proof methods of Section 3 can be used for other purposes also; in [10] we use
them to study when di)erent protocols may be safely combined.
1.1. Strand spaces
We very brieIy summarize the ideas behind the strand space model [26]; see also
Appendix A.
A is the set of messages that can be sent between principals. We call elements of
A terms. A is freely generated from two disjoint sets, T (representing texts such as
nonces or names) and K (representing keys) by means of concatenation and encryption.
The concatenation of terms g and h is denoted g h, and the encryption of h using key
K is denoted {|h|}K (see Appendix A.3).
For example, in the Needham–Schroeder protocol [17], the initiator A sends a term
of the form {|Na A|}KB to start an exchange intended for B. This is a ciphertext created
using B’s public key KB; the plaintext is the result of concatenating a nonce (random
bitstring) Na and A’s name.
A term t is a subterm of another term t′, written t❁ t′, if starting with t we can
reach t′ by repeatedly concatenating with arbitrary terms and encrypting with arbitrary
keys. Hence, K ❁ {|t|}K , except in case K ❁ t. The subterms of t are the values that are
uttered when t is sent; in {|t|}K ; K is not uttered but used (see De/nition 21).
For instance, the subterms of {|Na A|}KB are Na; A, the concatenated message Na A,
and {|Na A|}KB itself. The key KB is not part of what is uttered; it just contributes to
how the message is constructed.
A strand is a sequence of message transmissions and receptions, where transmission
of a term t is represented as +t and reception of term t is represented as −t. A strand
element is called a node. If s is a strand, 〈s; i〉 is the ith node on s. The relation n ⇒ n′
holds between nodes n and n′ if n= 〈s; i〉 and n′= 〈s; i + 1〉. Hence, n ⇒+ n′ means
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that n= 〈s; i〉 and n′= 〈s; j〉 for some j¿i. The relation n→ n′ represents inter-strand
communication; it means that term(n)= + t and node term(n′)=− t.
Continuing with the Needham–Schroeder protocol as our pedagogical illustration, an
initiator strand o)ers a sequence of events of the form
〈+{|Na A|}KB ; −{|Na Nb|}KA ; +{|Nb|}KB〉:
In this strand si, the initiator A sends a term {|Na A|}KB intended for the responder B, and
expects to receive back a term of the form {|Na Nb|}KA , after which it will send {|Nb|}KB .
The reception is 〈si; 2〉 and the /nal transmission is 〈si; 3〉. The responder strands o)er
a sequence of events of the complementary form
〈−{|Na A|}KB ; +{|Na Nb|}KA ; −{|Nb|}KB〉:
When the data values Na; A; : : :, match between an initiator strand si and a responder
strand sr , then we have 〈si; 1〉→ 〈sr; 1〉 and 〈sr; 2〉→ 〈si; 2〉. An initiator or responder
strand has four parameters (or degrees of freedom), namely the two nonces Na and Nb
and the two names A and B. For this illustration, we regard the public keys KA and KB
to be reliably determined from A and B, possibly by some public key infrastructure.
When we write si ∈NSInit[A; B; Na; Nb] in this illustration, we will mean that si is
an initiator strand using the particular values shown as parameters, and similarly for
sr ∈NSResp[A; B; Na; Nb]. The principal active in NSInit[A; B; Na; Nb] as initiator is A,
while the principal active in NSResp[A; B; Na; Nb] as responder is B.
A strand space  is a set of strands.  typically will not contain strands of
every possible kind NSInit[A; B; Na; Nb] and NSResp[A; B; Na; Nb], modeling the fact that
nonces are chosen from a large set and are used very sparsely, even over substantial
periods. The two relations ⇒ and → jointly impose a graph structure on the nodes of
. The vertices of this graph are the nodes, and the edges are the union of ⇒ and →.
We say that a term t originates at a node n= 〈s; i〉 if the sign of n is positive;
t❁ term(n); and t ❁ term(〈s; i′〉) for every i′¡i. Thus, n represents a message trans-
mission that includes t, and it is the /rst node in s including t. For instance, if
si ∈NSInit[A; B; Na; Nb], then Na and A both originate at 〈si; 1〉. If sr ∈NSResp[A; B; Na;
Nb], then Nb originates at 〈sr; 2〉, assuming that Nb is distinct from Na and A, which
have already been received at 〈sr; 1〉.
If a value originates on only one node in the strand space, we call it uniquely
originating; uniquely originating values are desirable as nonces and session keys. In a
particular strand space, a nonce Na may originate uniquely on 〈si; 1〉, in which case there
is at most one strand in NSInit[A; B; Na; Nb]. A is unlikely to originate uniquely, because
the same name will be used in many runs with many partners. When we assume that a
value like Na originates uniquely in some strand space , we are e)ectively assuming
that  is not unrealistically large, in a particular sense, namely so large as to contain
independent events in which the same value is repeatedly chosen at random from a
large set.
A bundle is a causally well-founded collection of nodes and arrows of both kinds. In
a bundle, when a strand receives a message m, there is a unique node transmitting m
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Fig. 1. A bundle: intended run of Need-
ham–Schroeder.
Fig. 2. A bundle: penetrated run of Needham–Schroeder.
Fig. 3. Penetrator strands for Needham–Schroeder attack.
from which the message was immediately received. By contrast, when a strand transmits
a message m, many strands (or none) may immediately receive m (see De/nition 19).
The height of a strand in a bundle is the number of nodes on the strand that are in
the bundle. Authentication theorems generally assert that a strand has at least a given
height in some bundle, meaning that the principal must have engaged in at least that
many steps of its run. Two illustrative bundles are shown in Figs. 1 and 2. In Fig. 1,
initiator and responder match strands in the expected way, while in Fig. 2 a penetrator
manipulates B into believing that A is having a session with B, whereas in fact A
intends to have a session with P [12, 13]. More formally, the strand on the left side is
in the set NSInit[A; P; Na Nb], not NSInit[A; B; Na; Nb].
Given any bundle C, there is a natural partial ordering on the nodes of C, which we
refer to as 4C, according to which n1 4Cn2 if there is a path from n1 to n2 using zero
or more arrows of either kind (De/nition 20). This relation expresses the fact that n1
causally contributes to n2 occurring in C. In Figs. 1 and 2, the relation happens to be a
linear ordering, but this is not true in Fig. 3, where neither K node is accessible from
the other.
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A strand represents the local view of a participant in a run of a protocol. For a
legitimate participant, it represents the messages that participant would send or receive
as part of one particular run of his side of the protocol. We call a strand representing
a legitimate participant a regular strand. For the penetrator, the strand represents an
atomic deduction. More complex actions can be formed by connecting several penetra-
tor strands. While regular principals are represented only by what they say and hear,
the behavior of the penetrator is represented more explicitly, because the values he
deduces are treated as if they had been said publicly.
We partition penetrator strands according to the operations they exemplify. E-strands
encrypt when given a key and a plaintext; D-strands decrypt when given a decryption
key and matching ciphertext; C-strands and S-strands concatenate and separate terms,
respectively; K-strands emit keys from a set of known keys; and M-strands emit known
atomic texts or guesses (see De/nition 23).
As an example, the compound behavior of the penetrator P, shown at the center
top in Fig. 2, can be realized using several of our oFcial penetrator strands as shown
in Fig. 3, in which nodes 1 and 6 represent the nodes shared with Fig. 2. This
/gure should be regarded as a part of Fig. 2, shown separately simply to reduce its
complexity. Some nodes have been labelled for later use.
In Fig. 3, the penetrator emits a private key K−1P that is known to himself, and uses
the result on a D strand to decrypt the incoming message. He emits a public key KB
known (presumably) to everyone, using it in an encryption strand to produce the term
{|Na A|}KB , needed to start the process of duping B. The other penetrator action shown
in Fig. 2 may be expanded in a similar manner.
1.2. New components
When a node transmits or receives a concatenated message, the penetrator – using
C-strands and S-strands – has full power over how the parts are concatenated together.
Thus, the important units for protocol correctness are what we call the components.
A term t0 is a component of t if t0❁ t; t0 is not a concatenated term, and every t1 = t0
such that t0❁ t1❁ t is a concatenated term. Components are either atomic values or
encryptions (see De/nition 22). For instance, the term {|Na A|}KB consists of a single
component, while Na A has two components, the atomic values Na and A. We say t is
a component of a node n if t is a component of term(n).
A term t is new at n= 〈s; i〉 if t is a component of term(n), but t is not a component
of node 〈s; j〉 for every j¡i (De/nition 22). A component is new even if it has occurred
earlier as a nested subterm of some larger component · · · {| · · · t · · · |}K · · · . For instance,
{|Na A|}KP is new on the top left node of Fig. 2, and Na is new on the last node of the
D strand in Fig. 3.
When a component occurs new on a regular node, but was a subterm of some
previous node, then the principal executing that strand has done some cryptographic
work to extract it as a new component. The idea of emphasizing components and the
regular nodes at which they occur new is due to Song [23].
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2. Bundle equivalences and graph operations
2.1. Bundle equivalence
Denition 1. Bundles C;C′ on a strand space  are equivalent i) they have the same
regular nodes. A set  of bundles is invariant under bundle equivalences if whenever
bundles C and C′ are equivalent, C∈ ⇒ C′ ∈.
Agreement and non-injective agreement properties [15, 26, 28] are invariant under
bundle equivalences in this sense. For instance, a non-injective agreement property,
expressed in our framework, asserts that whenever a bundle contains a protocol strand
(for instance, a responder strand) of a certain height, then it also contains a matching
strand (for instance, an initiator strand using the same data values) of suitable height.
As such, it always concerns what nodes, representing regular activity of the protocol,
must be present in bundles. Penetrator activity may or may not be present.
Secrecy properties may also be expressed in a form that is invariant under bundle
equivalences. We say (temporarily) that a value t is uncompromised in C if for every
C′ equivalent to C, there is no node n∈C′ such that term(n)= t. In this form, a value
is uncompromised if the penetrator cannot extract it in explicit form without further
cooperation of regular strands. When stated in this form, the assertion that a value is
uncompromised is invariant under bundle equivalences.
2.2. Graph operations
A graph operation on a bundle C consists of a sequence of one or more of the
following:
(1) Deletion of any set of penetrator strands from the bundle, with the incident →
edges.
(2) Addition of edges n→ n′ with term(n)=+a, term(n′)=−a.
(3) Deletion of edges n→ n′.
A graph operation yields a new graph C′. However, the graph C′ is not necessarily a
bundle. For instance, if n→ n′ is an edge of Cwith n a penetrator node, removal of the
strand that contains n is a graph operation which causes the resulting graph to have a
negative node with no in-arrow.
A lonely node in a strand space graph is a node with no incoming edge (if the node is
negative) or no outgoing edge (if the node is positive). Lonely negative nodes are ruled
out by the de/nition of bundle, whereas lonely positive nodes are allowed. Similarly,
a node in a strand space graph is gregarious if it has more than one edge leaving or
entering it. Gregarious negative nodes are ruled out, whereas gregarious positive ones
are allowed. In applying graph operations on bundles, we must be careful not to create
lonely or gregarious negative nodes.
Proposition 1. Suppose C is a bundle and C′ is obtained from C by a graph operation
such that
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Fig. 4. E–D redundancy.
Fig. 5. C–S redundancy.
(1) For any edge n → n′ of C′ there is a sequence of nodes and bundle edges
n= n1 → · · · → nk = n′ in C.
(2) C′ has no lonely or gregarious negative nodes.
Then C′ is a bundle. Moreover; C′ is equivalent to C and the ordering on C′ is a
restriction of the ordering on C.
Proof. The nodes in any connected sequence in C′ is a subsequence of the nodes of
a connected sequence in C. To show C′ is acyclic, notice that by assumption 1, for
any non-trivial cycle in C′ there is a non-trivial cycle in C. Thus C′ is a bundle. It is
equivalent to C because a graph operation modi/es only the set of penetrator nodes
included in the bundle.
3. Redundancies and paths
We turn our attention to the portions of a bundle that contain penetrator activity,
and the ways that we can simplify those portions.
3.1. Redundancies
Denition 2. A redundancy in a bundle C is any labeled subgraph of C that has one
of the forms given in Figs. 4 and 5.
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Fig. 6. E–D redundancy elimination.
Fig. 7. C–S redundancy elimination.
Each redundancy contains nodes on two penetrator strands, indicated by the symbol
•, and a number of “fringe” nodes indicated by the symbol ◦. The nodes are connected
by inward edges ◦→•, outward edges •→◦ and internal edges •→•. The fringe nodes
◦ may be either regular nodes or penetrator nodes.
The presence of redundancies in a bundle makes it more diFcult to see what the
penetrator can actually do, and in particular whether any attacks can be crafted by a
circuitous combination of strands. The purpose of this section is to show redundancies
can be eliminated without any weakening of the penetrator’s capability.
Proposition 2. Given any bundle C there exists an equivalent bundle C′ with no re-
dundancies. Moreover; the penetrator nodes of C′ is a subset of the penetrator nodes
of C and the ordering ≺C′ is a restriction of the ordering ≺C. If there exists n∈C
such that term(n)= t; then there exists n′ ∈C′ such that term(n′)= t.
Proof. Consider each one of the redundancy types shown in Figs. 4 and 5. Each one
of these redundancies is a subgraph of C consisting of two penetrator strands sL and sR,
some arrows into the subgraph and some arrows out of the subgraph. Notice that by
suitably replicating the strand sR in each one of the redundancy cases, we can assume
the positive nodes of sR are not gregarious, that is, have exactly one outgoing arrow.
For each such subgraph,
(1) Add the edges indicated by the dotted lines as shown in Figs. 6 and 7. In the
case of C–S elimination, two new edges are added; in the case of E–D elimination
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only one new edge is added. For each such new edge n→ n′, there is clearly
a path n → n1 → · · · → nk = n′ in C. Note that the addition of this edge creates
some gregarious positive and negative nodes. In the next step we will remove the
redundant edges leading to the gregarious negative nodes.
(2) Delete the right penetrator strand sR. As a result of removing sR, those edges
m→ n′ going out of sR are removed as well. In step 1, we added an arrow into
n′ so that removal of m→ n′ does not leave us with a lonely negative node.
(3) As a result of the previous step, some positive nodes may have no outgoing arrows.
These are shown by ♣ in the /gure. However, the presence of lonely positive
nodes does not violate the bundle property so no further action is necessary to
deal with these.
Note that the graph operation above satis/es the conditions of Proposition 1. Hence,
the resulting graph is bundle equivalent to C; and its ordering is a restriction of the
ordering of C: Note also that for each of the deleted nodes on sR, there is another node
with the same term that does not lie on sR.
3.2. Penetrator paths and normal bundles
m⇒+ n means that m; n are nodes on the same strand with n occuring after m
(De/nition 18, Clause 4). The notation m → n means:
• either m⇒+ n with term(m) negative and term(n) positive, or else
• m→ n.
A path p through C is any /nite sequence of nodes and edges n1 → n2 → · · · → nk .
Clearly, n≺Cn′ whenever there is a path n= n1 → n2 → · · · → nk = n′. We assume all
paths begin on a positive node, and end on a negative node.
We refer to the ith node of the path p as pi. The length of p will be |p|, and we
will write ‘(p) to mean p|p|, i.e. the last node in p.
A penetrator path is one in which all nodes other than possibly the /rst or the last
node are penetrator nodes. As an example of a penetrator path, in which the /rst and
last nodes are in fact regular, consider again the partial bundle shown in Fig. 3. The
path
 = 1 → 2 ⇒+ 3 → 4 ⇒+ 5 → 6
is a path that traverses penetrator nodes, connecting A’s /rst transmission {|Na A|}KP to
B’s /rst reception {|Na A|}KB . In contrast to , the path
 =  1 →  2 ⇒+ 5 → 6
starts on a penetrator node and ends on a regular node. Observe that by our conventions,
 3 and  4 are well-de/ned (and equal to 5 and 6 respectively).
In a number of examples in the coming pages, we will use  and  as constants
denoting these two particular paths, while p, by contrast, will be used as a variable
ranging over paths in general.
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Denition 3. Given a path p, one ⇒+ edge immediately precedes another ⇒+ edge
in p i) they are separated in p by a single → edge.
For instance, 2⇒+ 3 immediately precedes 4⇒+ 5 in .
Consider a ⇒+-edge between penetrator nodes. There are four penetrator strand types
with a negative node followed by a positive node, namely E, D, C, and S strands.
Denition 4. A ⇒+-edge is constructive if it is part of a E or C strand. It is destructive
if it is part of a D or if it is part of a S strand.
A penetrator node n is initial if it is a K or M node.
Any penetrator path that begins at a regular node contains only constructive and
destructive ⇒+-edges, because initial nodes can occur only at the beginning of a path.
Proposition 3. In a bundle; a constructive edge immediately followed by a destructive
edge has one of the following two forms:
(1) Part of a Eh;K immediately followed by part of a Dh;K strand for some h; K
(2) Part of a Cg; h immediately followed by part of a Sg; h strand for some g; h.
Proof. This follows immediately from freeness of the message algebra.
Proposition 4. If the bundle C has no redundancies of type C–S and E–D; then for
any penetrator path of C; every destructive edge precedes every constructive edge.
Proof. If some constructive edge precedes a destructive one, then some constructive
edge immediately precedes a destructive one. However, if the bundle has no redun-
dancies, then by Proposition 3, a constructive edge cannot immediately precede a de-
structive one.
Since the property just introduced is very important, we give it a name, stressing
the analogy with Prawitz’s notion of normal derivation [22]:
Denition 5. A bundle C is normal if, for any penetrator path of C; every destructive
edge precedes every constructive edge.
[5] /rst observed the analogy between penetrator activities and natural deduction
inferences. By Propositions 2 and 4, we may infer:
Proposition 5 (Penetrator normal form lemma). For any bundle C there exists an
equivalent normal bundle C′. Moreover; the penetrator nodes of C′ form a
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Fig. 8. Entering a D strand through a key edge. Fig. 9. Entering a E strand through a key edge.
subset of the penetrator nodes of C and the ordering 4C′ is a restriction of the
ordering 4C. If there exists n∈C such that term(n)= t; then there exists n′ ∈C′ such
that term(n′)= t.
3.3. Rising and falling paths
Denition 6. A penetrator path is falling if for all adjacent nodes n → n′ on the path
term(n′)❁ term(n).
A penetrator path is rising if for all adjacent nodes n → n′ on the path term(n)
❁ term(n′).
The path  from Fig. 3 contains a falling subpath 1 → · · · → 4 and a rising subpath
3 → · · · → 6. The transmission edge 3→ 4 may be associated with either subpath,
or regarded as a bridge between the two subpaths.
A path containing only destructive edges may not be falling, since a destructive path
may traverse a decryption strand entering through the key transmission edge (Fig. 8).
Call the edge labeled K−1 in Fig. 8 a D-key edge. The other incoming edge into a D
strand is a D-cyphertext edge.
In a symmetrical way, a constructive path may traverse an encryption strand entering
through the key transmission edge (Fig. 9). Call the edge labeled K in Fig. 9 an E-key
edge. The other incoming edge into an E strand is an E-plaintext edge. The path 
from Fig. 3 traverses no key edges, while path  traverses an E-key edge.
For a constructive path, we are entitled to a stronger conclusion. If p is any con-
structive path, then p can traverse a E-key edge only once, along the edge p1→p2,
and only if term(p1)∈K. After that, later nodes must have a compound term, not an
atomic term such as a key.
Proposition 6. A destructive path that enters decryption strands only through
D-cyphertext edges is falling. A constructive path that enters encryption strands only
through E-plaintext edges is rising; and this is the case for any constructive p such
that term(p1) =∈K:
Moreover, the sequence of penetrator strands traversed on a falling path is con-
strained by the structure of term(p1). We use the relation t0❁K t, which means that
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t0 occurs somewhere in t such that every surrounding encryption uses a key K ∈K
(De/nition 22). Recall that ‘(p) is the last node on the path p, i.e. p|p|.
Proposition 7. (1) Suppose that p is a falling penetrator path; suppose pi is a neg-
ative penetrator node; and suppose 1¡i¡|p|. Then term(pi) is either an encryption
or a concatenation; and:
(a) If term(pi)= {|h|}K ; then pi lies on a D-strand; and term(pi+1)= h; and
(b) If term(pi)= g h; then pi lies on a S-strand; and either term(pi+1)= g or term
(pi+1)= h.
(2) If pi is a positive node with 16i¡|p|; then term(pi)= term(pi+1).
(3) Suppose p is a falling penetrator path; and suppose that every D-strand s that
p traverses has key edge K−1; for some K ∈K. Then term(‘(p))❁K term(p1).
Proof. The assertion for a positive node pi is immediate from the de/nition of paths.
So consider a negative node pi.
Since i¡|p|, there is a node pi+1 on this penetrator path, so pi is a penetrator
node. The strand on which pi lies is neither a K-strand nor an M-strand, as these lack
negative nodes. It is neither a C-strand nor an E-strand because p is a falling path.
Hence only D-strands and S-strands remain, and the rest follows from the freeness of
the message algebra A.
To see that term(‘(p))❁K term(p1) when there exists a falling path traversing only
D-strands with decryption keys in K−1, consider the strands in p in reverse order
starting at ‘(p) with term(‘(p)). For each S-strand, perform a concatenation with the
term on the other positive node of that strand (i.e. the positive node not belonging to
p). For each D-strand, perform an encryption with the inverse of the decryption key
on that strand. The resulting term is term(p1).
Hence, as we traverse a falling penetrator path, we take successive subterms of the
term at the start, with each successive strand determined by the topmost operator of
the current term. Observe also that if term(‘(p))=K , then there must be some i with
16i6|p| and term(pi) a component of p1; simply proceed along the path past all
(contiguous) S-strands; if this is ‘(p) then K is the component, while otherwise it is
some t0 with K ❁ t0.
Symmetrically, the sequence of penetrator strands traversed on a rising path is con-
strained by the structure of term(‘(p)), although we will not need this fact.
One curlicue is useful. A bundle may contain a penetrator D-strand s in which a
key K is used to decrypt {|K |}K−1 , thereby obtaining K . Clearly, we may use a graph
operation to splice s out of the bundle, connecting the incoming key edge with term
K to the outgoing plaintext edge with term K .
Proposition 8. If C is any bundle; there is an equivalent bundle C′ containing no D-
strands of the form −{|K |}K−1 ⇒−K⇒+K . The resulting bundle C′ is normal if
C is.
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Fig. 10. Entry bridge. Fig. 11. Exit bridge.
Fig. 12. External bridge. Fig. 13. Internal bridge.
3.4. Bridges and bridge terms
Of special interest are the message transmission edges that come after all destructive
edges and before all constructive edges in a normal penetrator path. We call them
bridges.
Denition 7. A bridge in a bundle C is a message transmission edge m→ n embedded
in a subgraph of one the types shown in Figs. 10–13.
If m→ n is a bridge, then its bridge term is term(m), which equals term(n).
A bridge is simple i) its bridge term is simple, that is, is not of the form g h.
Any edge between regular nodes is an external bridge. The source m of a bridge
m→ n is never on a constructive penetrator strand, and the target n is never on a
destructive penetrator strand. The edge 3→ 4 is the only bridge on our example path
 from Fig. 3.
Proposition 9. Suppose that C is a normal bundle; and p is any penetrator path in
C. Then p traverses exactly one bridge. Any destructive edge along p precedes the
bridge of p; and any constructive edge on p follows the bridge of p. Any bundle C
can be replaced by an equivalent bundle C′ in which all bridges are simple; moreover
if C is normal so is C′.
Proof. Consider a bridge ◦ g h→◦ that transmits a concatenated term g h from a node on
a destructive penetrator node or regular node to a constructive or regular node. Replace
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the bridge by a graph consisting of two bridges:
These graph operations do not create lonely or gregarious negative nodes and do not
introduce cycles in the graph. Moreover if the original bundle is normal, that is contains
no C–S or E–D redundancies, the new bundle is also normal.
By this proposition, there is a function pbt(·) from paths to terms that is well-de/ned
on every penetrator path in normal bundles. Given a penetrator path p, pbt(p) is the
path bridge term of p, which is the bridge term of the (unique) bridge on p. We
may assume that pbt(p) is always simple, which is to say either an atomic value or
an encryption.
The bridge 3→ 4 carries the term Na A, so it is not simple. Applying the construc-
tion just given in the proof, we obtain two paths; they share their nodes except those
bordering the bridges. One path has bridge term Na, and the other has bridge term A.
A bundle with simple bridges is a kind of worst case scenario, because the penetrator
separates and re-concatenates every message between regular nodes. However, simple
bridges lead to simple proofs.
3.5. Transforming edges and transformation paths
Given a test of the form n⇒+ n′, our strategy for proving the authentication test
results is to consider the paths leading from n to n′. Because there is a value a
originating uniquely at n, and it is received back at n′, there must be a path leading
from n to n′ (apart from the trivial path that follows the strand from n to n′). Moreover,
since a is received in a new form at n′, there must be a step along the path that changes
its form; this is a transforming edge. The incoming and outgoing authentication test
results codify conditions under which we can infer that a transforming edge lies on a
regular strand.
Our proofs focus on the transformation paths leading from n to n′ that keep track
of a “relevant” component containing a. The relevant component changes only when
a transforming edge is traversed, and a occurs in a new component.
We regard the edge n⇒+ n′ as a transformed edge, because the same value a occurs
in both nodes, but node n′ contains a in transformed form.
Denition 8. The edge n1⇒+ n2 is a transformed edge for a∈A (respectively, a trans-
forming edge for a∈A) if n1 is positive and n2 is negative (respectively, n1 is negative
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and n2 is positive), a❁ term(n1), and there is a new component t2 of n2 such that
a❁ t2.
Thus, a transformed edge emits a and later tests for its presence in a new form.
A transforming edge receives a and later emits it in transformed form. We have chosen
to interpret a “form” in which a occurs as a component in which it occurs. Considering
again si ∈NSInit[A; B; Na; Nb], the /rst two nodes
+ {|Na A|}KB ⇒ −{|Na Nb|}KA
are a transformed edge for Na, while the second and third nodes
−{|Na Nb|}KA ⇒ + {|Nb|}KB
are a transforming edge for Nb. Conversely, for sr ∈NSResp[A; B; Na; Nb], the /rst two
nodes are a transforming edge for Na, while the second and third nodes are a trans-
formed edge for Nb.
Denition 9. A transformation path is a path for which each node ni is labelled by
a component Li of ni in such a way that Li =Li+1 unless ni ⇒+ ni+1 and Li+1 is new
on the strand of ni+1.
We can regard a transformation path as a sequence of pairs (ni;Li) consisting of
a node and a component Li of that node. If Li =Li+1 and a❁Li and a❁Li+1, then
ni ⇒+ ni+1 is a transforming edge (De/nition 8) for a. This is the explanation for the
name, transformation path. The sequence
〈(1; {|Na A|}KP); (2; {|Na A|}KP); (3; Na); (4; Na);
(5; {|Na A|}KB); (6; {|Na A|}KB)〉
is a transformation path for Na. We could also choose a longer example from Figs. 2
and 3, because the path p need not be a penetrator path, and need not terminate when
a regular node is reached.
By inspecting the forms of penetrator strand (De/nition 23), we observe:
Proposition 10. If (p;L) is a transformation path in which Li =Li+1; and pi is a
penetrator node; then pi ⇒+ pi+1 lies either on a D-strand or an E-strand.
The next proposition states that given a node such as 6; it is possible to construct
a transformation path like the one we have just given; leading back to a node at which
Na originates.
Proposition 11. Suppose C is a bundle in  with n′ ∈C; and suppose a❁ t where t is
a component of n′. There is a transformation path p in C such that a originates at
p1; ‘(p)= n′; L|p|= t; and a❁Li for all i.
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We may choose p so as not to traverse the key edge of a D- or E-strand.
Proof. We will construct the path p backwards. Let n1 = n′, let L1 = t, and suppose
that (inductively) we have a transformation path
(nk+1;Lk+1) → (nk ;Lk) → · · · → (n1;L1)
such that a❁Lj for all j in the path. If a originates at nk+1 then p is complete. So
suppose nk+1 does not originate at nk+1.
If nk+1 is negative, then C contains a unique nk+2 such that nk+2 → nk+1. Extend p
backwards to (nk+2;Lk+1).
Suppose nk+1 is positive, and Lk+1 is new. There exists a node nk+2⇒+ nk+1 such
that a❁ term(nk+2), since a does not originate at nk+1. Extend p backwards to contain
some such nk+2 and let Lk+2 be any component of nk+2 which contains a.
If Lk+1 is not new, then there is a node nk+2⇒+ nk+1 such that term(nk+2) has
component Lk+1. Extend p backwards to (nk+2;Lk+1).
Observe that if nk+1 is the positive (ciphertext) node on a E-strand, then we may
select the plaintext node as nk+2, because it does contain a, and the ciphertext is new.
If nk+1 is the positive (plaintext) node on a D-strand, then we may select the ciphertext
node as nk+2, because it does contain a, and the plaintext is new (by Proposition 8).
Thus, p never traverses a key edge.
Because 4C is a well-founded relation (Proposition 27) and i¡j implies nj ≺Cni,
eventually nj is a node at which a originates.
Proposition 12. Suppose p is a transformation path such that a❁Li for every i and
L1 =Ln. Then p has a transforming edge for a.
Proof. Argue by contradiction. If there is no transforming edge for a in the path, then
for every edge (pi;Li)⇒+ (pi+1;Li+1) in p, there is no new component in pi+1 con-
taining a. By de/nition of transformation path, this means Li =Li+1. So in particular,
L1 =Ln.
In the case of our path , the edges 2⇒ 3 and 4⇒ 5 are transforming edges.
Note that 3 lies on a D strand and 5 lies on a E strand; they are the values p and
p mentioned in the next proposition (respectively). The proposition also entails that
the distinguished component L1, which may be a subterm of term(p1), stands on its
own as the whole of some message term(p).
Proposition 13. Suppose C is a normal bundle.
(1) Let (p;L) be a transformation path in C such that p is a penetrator path and
term(p1) is simple. There is a smallest index  such that term(p)=Li =L|p|;
for all i such that  6 i 6 |p|. Moreover; if L is not constant then p is the
positive node of an E-strand.
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Fig. 14. An ineFcient bundle for a /ctitious protocol.
(2) Let (p;L) be a transformation path in C such that p is a penetrator path and
term(‘(p)) simple. Either L is constant or there is a smallest index  such that
L =L1. The positive node p lies on a D-strand and term(p−1)=L−1.
In either case; there is an index  such that term(p)=L1.
Proof. New components of penetrator strands occur only on D-strands or E-strands.
Since p is a penetrator path, Li+1 =Li if and only if pi+1 is the positive node of an
E-strand or the positive node of a D-strand. If pi+1 is the positive node of a E-strand,
then term(pi+1) is an encrypted term and therefore term(pi+1) has only one component.
Therefore, term(pi+1)=Li+1. If pi+1 is the positive node of a D-strand, then pi is an
encrypted term so that similarly term(pi)=Li.
Notice that if L is constant and term(pi) is simple, then term(pi) consists of a
single component, and Li = term(pi). Hence, L1 =L|p|= term(pi).
3.6. E=cient bundles
Denition 10. A bundle is e=cient if and only if; for every node m and negative
penetrator node n; if every component of n is a component of m; then there is no
regular node m′ such that m′≺m′≺ n.
We call a bundle of this kind eFcient because the penetrator does the most with
what he has rather than making use of additional regular nodes.
The bundles we show in Figs. 1 and 2 and 3 are eFcient. Whenever the penetrator
node handles a term, there is no earlier node that has all the same components, and a
regular node has been traversed in between. However, in the case of the non-sensical
variant of the Needham–Schroeder protocol shown in Fig. 14, the edge marked ♣
would need to be removed, and replaced with the dashed diagonal. The negative pen-
etrator node n must not receive its term from the third initiator node, when it can be
obtained directly from the /rst initiator node. We can always replace a bundle by an
eFcient one, and we can do so without interfering with the Normal Form Lemma:
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Proposition 14. Any bundle C is equivalent to an e=cient bundle C′. C′ may be chosen
such that n∈C implies n∈C′. If a bundle is e=cient; then it has an equivalent normal
bundle which is also e=cient.
Proof. Consider a negative penetrator node n and a node m such that every component
of n is a component of m. We show how to modify C by graph operations, so that in
the resulting bundle there will be no regular node between m and n in the ordering ≺.
For each component t0 of m, add an arrow m → into a cluster St0 of S strands to
extract the term t0. This is possible since t0❁∅ term(m). We refer to the positive S
node whose term is t0 as m′t0 .
We can now add arrows from the nodes m′t0 into a cluster of C nodes from which
emerges an arrow whose term is term(n). Observe that we have not omitted nodes,
but have simply added penetrator nodes on S and C strands.
Since n is negative, there is a unique incoming arrow → n in C. By graph operations
we can replace → n with the arrow emerging from the cluster of C strands. The
resulting graph has no cycles, and no lonely or gregarious negative nodes are created
by this graph operation. In the new bundle, the nodes m and n are not connected by
any path which has an intermediate regular node. These operations add a new set of
nodes A to the graph, but each of these new nodes can only be reached (from below)
by paths which traverse m.
To show that any eFcient bundle has an equivalent normal eFcient bundle, it suFces
to show that the graph operations used to eliminate redundancies in Proposition 2
preserve eFciency. The only graph operation which might destroy eFciency is adding
a message transmission edge between two nodes. However, these nodes are connected
in the original bundle by a path which only traverses penetrator nodes. Thus no new
paths connecting a regular node to a shadowed node can appear in the modi/ed graph.
In eFcient bundles, no transformation path ever needs to revisit the same distin-
guished component that occurs in an “earlier” transformation path (where “earlier”
means that there is a regular node between the end of one and the beginning of the
other):
Proposition 15. Suppose C is a normal e=cient bundle and (p;L) and (p′;L′) are
transformation paths in C. Assume p is a penetrator path which starts at a simple
term; p′ is a penetrator path which ends at a simple term; and there is some regular
node m such that ‘(p)≺m≺p′1. Then for all i with 1 6 i 6 |p| and j with 1 6
j 6 |p′|; Li =L′j .
Proof. Choose i; j; by Proposition 13, there are indices  6 i and  ¿ j such that
term(p)=Li and term(p′)=L
′
j . In particular, p≺m≺p′ and term(p), term(p′)
both have single components. Therefore, by bundle eFciency, term(p) = term(p′), or
equivalently Li =L′1 .
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4. A method for authentication
In this section we describe our method for establishing authentication results. We
/rst show how to establish whether keys are accessible to the penetrator or not (Sec-
tion 4.1). We de/ne three kinds of authentication tests, and state a theorem about
each one, showing what other regular nodes must exist in a bundle, if that bundle
contains an example of an authentication test. We will illustrate the /rst authentica-
tion test result using the Needham–Schroeder and Needham–Schroeder–Lowe proto-
cols. Proofs are gathered in Section 4.3, after the main ideas have been explained and
illustrated.
In the next section (Section 5), we will apply these authentication test theorems
to additional examples. A surprising amount of protocol veri/cation and discovery of
counterexamples can be derived directly from the results of the current section.
4.1. Penetrable keys and safe keys
Given a strand space , we can inductively de/ne the set of keys that may become
known to the penetrator. We use the relation ❁K de/ned in De/nition 22; t0❁K t
means that t0 occurs as a subterm of t in a position where all encryptions surrounding
it use keys K ∈K. Thus, either t can be constructed from t0 simply by (possibly
repeated) concatenation, or else t can be written in the form
· · · {| · · · t0 · · · |}K · · ·
where K ∈K and the dots hide only concatenations and other encryptions with keys in
K. The set K−1 means the set of inverses of keys in K. For instance, let S = {KB}=
{K−1B }−1. Then Na ❁S Nb{|Na A|}KB . Moreover, Nb ❁∅ Nb {|Na A|}KB .
In the base case of this de/nition we refer to KP, which is the set of keys known
to the penetrator initially, apart from any protocol activity (De/nition 23).
Denition 11. Let P0 =KP.
Let Pi+1 = Pi ∪Y , where K ∈Y if and only if there exists a positive regular node
n∈ and a term t such that
(1) t is a new component of n, and
(2) K ❁Pi−1 t,
P =
⋃
i
Pi :
Thus, either a penetrable key is already penetrated (KP), or else some regular strand
puts it in a form that could allow it to be penetrated, because for each key protecting it,
the matching decryption key is already penetrable. The justi/cation for this de/nition
is that any key that becomes available to the penetrator in any bundle is in fact a
member of P.
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Proposition 16. Let C be a bundle with n∈C and term(n)=K . Then K ∈ P.
The proof is contained in Section 4.3.1. P is a conservative approximation. It may
be larger than the set of keys that the penetrator can really capture, because the strand
that would put the key in danger may not be contained in any bundle.
Denition 12. Let S0 be the set of keys K such that K =∈KP and there is no positive
regular node n∈ and term t such that t is a new component of n and K ❁ t. Let
Si+1 be the set of keys K such that K =∈KP, and for every positive regular node n∈
and new component t of n, every occurrence of K in t lies within an encryption using
some key K0 where K−10 ∈Si:
· · · {| · · · K · · · |}K0 · · ·
S=
⋃
i Si. When K ∈S, we say that K is safe in .
Evidently, the set of safe keys is disjoint from P. However, there are strand spaces
 in which there are keys K such that K =∈ P∪S.
In practice, protocol secrecy goals frequently amount to showing that certain keys
are in either S0 or S1. Larger values of i seem rarely to occur in these protocols.
Showing that a private key or a long-term symmetric key is in S0 typically reduces to
checking that it is assumed not to be in KP, because protocols generally avoid emitting
terms containing these keys.
For instance, in the Needham–Schroeder protocol, if n is a regular node, then
K ❁ term(n). Hence, S0 =K\KP, which says that any key not initially known to the
penetrator is permanently safe.
Many protocols expect session keys to be generated by a key server, which sends
them encrypted in the long-term keys of two principals, and no principal ever re-
encrypts a session key under a new key. In a particular session, a session key K
may be sent encrypted with long term keys not in KP (or, if they are asymmetric,
their inverses are not in KP). If the server never re-sends the same session key K in
a di)erent session, we can infer that K ∈S1. This idea is illustrated in Sections 5.1
and 5.2.
There also exist protocols in which the session key is translated, in the sense that it is
sent out originally encrypted with one key and is later re-encrypted by another principal
under a new key. These protocols can also be correct, although they demand special
care. The TMN protocol is a (Iawed) example [24]. In the case of a correct protocol
of this form, it may be necessary to show that the session key is in S2. However,
the fact that S0 and S1 cover typical protocols makes this method for proving secrecy
particularly easy to use.
One can also prove that a non-key data value such as a nonce is kept secret in a
protocol; one simply shows that every regular component containing it is of the form
{|h|}K where K−1 ∈Si. Again, typically i=0 or 1. We call t a regular component if
there is a regular node n such that t is a component of term(n).
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4.2. The authentication tests
Fix some strand space . We identify segments of regular strands called tests whose
presence will guarantee the existence of other regular strands in the bundle; they are
strands with transforming edges operating on the test component.
Denition 13. t= {|h|}K is a test component for a in n if:
(1) a❁ t and t is a component of n.
(2) The term t is not a proper subterm of a component of any regular node n′ ∈.
The edge n0⇒+ n1 is a test for a if a uniquely originates at n0 and n0⇒+ n1 is a
transformed edge for a.
Clause 2 in the de/nition of test component requires test component not to occur as a
more nested, proper subterm (De/nition 21) of a component of a regular node, because
then the test component might be transformed “inadvertently”, so to speak, when the
larger unit is processed in some way. In that case, the penetrator could bene/t from
building a larger term to send to a regular participant, who might then emit some new
message of value to the penetrator.
In Needham–Schroeder, if sr ∈NSResp[A; B; Na; Nb], then {|Na Nb|}KA is a test compo-
nent for Nb in 〈sr; 2〉, because term(〈sr; 2〉)= {|Na Nb|}KA and this component does not
occur as a proper subterm of any other regular node. Assuming that the responder B
chooses Nb to be uniquely originating at 〈sr; 2〉, the edge 〈sr; 2〉⇒ 〈sr; 3〉 is a test for Nb.
Tests can use their test components in at least two di)erent ways. If the uniquely
originating value is sent in encrypted form, and the challenge is to decrypt it, then that
is an outgoing test. If it is received back in encrypted form, and the challenge is to
produce that encrypted form, then that is an incoming test. These two kinds of test are
illustrated in Fig. 15.
Denition 14. The edge n0⇒+ n1 is an outgoing test for a in t= {|h|}K if it is a test
for a in which: K−1 =∈ P; a does not occur in any component of n0 other than t; and
t is a test component for a in n0. The edge n0⇒+ n1 is an incoming test for a in
t1 = {|h|}K if it is a test for a in which K =∈ P and t1 is a test component for a in n1.
If K−1A =∈KP (hence K−1A ∈S0), then the edge 〈sr; 2〉⇒ 〈sr; 3〉 is an outgoing test for
Nb in {|Na Nb|}KA . It is not an incoming test for Nb in {|Nb|}KB , because the public key
KB is presumably in KP.
The three authentication test results that follow give a powerful method for estab-
lishing the authentication goals of protocols. The results with their proofs appear in
Section 4.3.2 as Propositions 19–21.
4.2.1. The outgoing authentication test
Authentication Test 1. Let C be a bundle with n′ ∈C; and let n⇒+ n′ be an outgoing
test for a in t.
(1) There exist regular nodes m;m′ ∈C such that t is a component of m and m⇒+ m′
is a transforming edge for a.
J.D. Guttman, F.J. Thayer / Theoretical Computer Science 283 (2002) 333–380 355
Fig. 15. Outgoing and incoming tests.
(2) Suppose in addition that a occurs only in component t1 = {|h1|}K1 of m′; that t1 is
not a proper subterm of any regular component; and that K−11 =∈ P. Then there
is a negative regular node m′′ with t1 as a component.
The meaning of this assertion is illustrated in Fig. 16. In this diagram, the two nodes
marked ◦ represent n and n′. The result assumes that a originates uniquely here (shown
by the ∗), and that the decryption key K−1 is safe. The diagram does not represent
the assumption that t not be a proper subterm of any regular component, which being
non-local is hard to display. The test establishes that C also contains regular nodes m
and m′ (marked • at right) with a transforming edge for a. With the assumptions on
t1 given in clause 2, there is also a negative regular node m′′, shown with a • on the
bottom line, of which t1 is a component.
4.2.1.1. Outgoing tests: the Needham–Schroeder illustration. We may illustrate the
outgoing authentication tests by Needham–Schroeder. Assume that C is a bundle, and
the C-height of sr ∈NSResp[A; B; Na; Nb] is 3, which means that all three nodes of sr
belong to C. Assume that K−1A =∈KP. Finally, assume that Nb originates uniquely, and
Nb =Na (which together mean that Nb originates uniquely at 〈sr; 2〉).
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Fig. 16. Authentication provided by an outgoing test.
Hence, the edge 〈sr; 2〉⇒ 〈sr; 3〉 is an outgoing test for Nb in {|Na Nb|}KA . By Authenti-
cation Test 1, there exist regular nodes m;m′ ∈C such that {|Na Nb|}KA is a component of
m and m⇒+ m′ is a transforming edge for a. The only negative regular node containing
a component of this form is 〈si; 2〉 for si ∈NSInit[A; B′; Na; Nb] and some responder B′.
Thus, the transforming edge m⇒+ m′ must be 〈si; 2〉⇒+ 〈si; 3〉, and si has C-height 3.
Unfortunately, we have not proved that si ∈NSInit[A; B; Na; Nb] for the expected re-
sponder B, rather than some other responder B′, and Fig. 2 is a counterexample in
which B′=P =B. Hence we have uncovered a limitation in the authentication achieved
by Needham–Schroeder, /rst noted by Lowe [12, 13], which led Lowe to amend the
protocol to contain the responder’s name B in the second message {|Na Nb B|}KA .
4.2.1.2. Needham–Schroeder–Lowe. Let us next consider a strand space  in which
the regular strands are:
• For si ∈NSLInit[A; B; Na; Nb], traces of the form
〈+{|Na A|}KB ; −{|Na NbB|}KA ; +{|Nb|}KB〉:
• For sr ∈NSLResp[A; B; Na; Nb], traces of the form
〈−{|Na A|}KB ; +{|Na Nb B|}KA ; −{|Nb|}KB〉:
To be precise, let Tname be a distinguished set within A with Tname⊂ T. NSLInit[A; B;
Na; Nb] and NSLResp[A; B; Na; Nb] are empty unless A; B∈ Tname, Na; Nb ∈ T but Na; Nb =∈
Tname. In addition, we assume that the set of responder strands NSLResp[A; B; Na; Nb]
is empty unless Nb =Na. This proof of the correctness of the protocol depends on the
assumption that the “public key of” mapping f :A → KA is injective.
Assume that C is a bundle, and the C-height of sr ∈NSLResp[A; B; Na; Nb] is 3. As-
sume that K−1A =∈KP. Finally, assume that Nb originates uniquely, and Nb =Na (which
together mean that Nb originates uniquely at 〈sr; 2〉).
As before, it follows that the edge 〈sr; 2〉⇒ 〈sr; 3〉 is an outgoing test for Nb in
{|Na Nb B|}KA . By Authentication Test 1, there exist regular nodes m;m′ ∈C such that
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{|Na Nb B|}KA is a component of m and m⇒+ m′ is a transforming edge for a. The only
negative regular node containing a component of this form is 〈si; 2〉 for si ∈NSLInit[A;
B; Na; Nb].
Thus, the transforming edge m⇒+ m′ must be 〈si; 2〉⇒+ 〈si; 3〉, and si has C-height 3.
This proves that the responder successfully authenticates the initiator in Needham–
Schroeder–Lowe.
We will also prove the initiator’s authentication guarantee. The proof is very similar,
except that it is necessary to use the second part of Authentication Test 1 as well as
the /rst part of it. We include it to illustrate the use of this proof method.
Let C be a bundle in , and si be an initiator’s strand in NSLInit[A; B; Na; Nb] with
C-height 3. Assume K−1A ; K
−1
B =∈KP, and suppose that Na is uniquely originating.
The edge 〈si; 1〉⇒ 〈si; 2〉 is an outgoing test for Na in {|Na A|}KB , so it follows (by
Authentication Test 1) that there is a regular transforming edge m⇒+ m′ in C with
{|Na A|}KB a component of the negative node m. This implies that m;m′ are the /rst
two nodes of a responder strand sr ∈NSLInit[A; B; Na; N ]. In this step, we used the
assumption that K−1B =∈KP, from which it follows that K−1B =∈ P.
However, we cannot yet be sure whether N =Nb. To infer that B has sent out the
same nonce Nb that A eventually receives, we use Part 2 of Authentication Test 1. It
implies that {|Na N B|}KA is a component of some negative regular node m′′. However,
m′′ can only be 〈s′i ; 2〉 for some s′i ∈NSLInit[A; B; Na; N ], since only the second node of
an initiator strand receives a component of this form. By the form of an initiator strand,
Na originates at 〈s′i ; 1〉. Since Na is uniquely originating, it follows that 〈s′i ; 1〉= 〈si; 1〉,
so s′i = si and N =Nb. In this step, we used the assumption that K
−1
A =∈KP, from which
it follows that K−1A =∈ P.
Thus, we have shown that C contains a responder strand
sr ∈ NSLResp[A; B; Na; Nb]
with C-height 2. This proves that the initiator successfully authenticates the responder
in Needham–Schroeder–Lowe.
4.2.2. The incoming authentication test
An authentication test result for incoming tests can be used to infer the existence of
a regular transforming edge in protocols in which a nonce is emitted in plaintext, for
instance as a challenge, and later received in encrypted form.
Authentication Test 2. Let C be a bundle with n′ ∈C; and let n⇒+ n′ be an incoming
test for a in t′. Then there exist regular nodes m;m′ ∈C such that t′ is a component
of m′ and m⇒+ m′ is a transforming edge for a.
The meaning of this assertion is illustrated in Fig. 17 using the same conventions
as in Fig. 16. We will apply the incoming authentication test in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
Although in this paper we will make no use of it, the outgoing and incoming au-
thentication tests also establish an ordering on the nodes, as n occurs before m and
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Fig. 17. Authentication provided by an incoming test.
m′, while n′ occurs after. The nodes are ordered n≺m≺m′≺ n′ in the causal order-
ing given in De/nition 20. The principal executing n and n′ can regard a session key
generated at m′ as “fresh”, because it was created more recently than the beginning of
his current run.
The authentication tests are also valid when n and n′ are not actually on the same
strand, but n is a node known to be in a bundle and to have uniquely originated the test
value a, and n′ is a node on a di)erent strand that later receives a in transformed form.
4.2.3. The unsolicited authentication test
The authentication property achieved by an unsolicited test is less informative, but
frequently useful, for instance when a key server authenticates its clients. We will
illustrate authentication via unsolicited tests in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
Denition 15. A negative node n is an unsolicited test for t= {|h|}K if t is a test
component for any a in n and K =∈ P.
Authentication Test 3. Let Cbe a bundle with n∈C; and let n be an unsolicited test for
t= {|h|}K . Then there exists a positive regular node m∈C such that t is a component
of m.
4.2.4. Usage of authentication tests
When asymmetric cryptography is in use, incoming and outgoing tests are used
in di)erent ways, as an outgoing test requires that K−1 =∈ P, while an incoming test
requires that K =∈ P.
An outgoing test can be used when the secrecy of the uniquely originating value
must be preserved. In that case, K is the public key of the intended interlocutor, so
that K−1 =∈ P (unless the private key has been compromised somehow). This method
is used in Needham–Schroeder, where Na is transmitted encrypted in the public key of
the responder, and returned encrypted with the public key of the initiator. Nb is treated
dually.
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An incoming test may be used when the secrecy of the value is not important.
Protocols in which the interlocutor proves its presence by signing a freshly presented
value with a private key use an incoming test.
When symmetric cryptography is in use, K−1 =K , so we do not have this contrast.
Indeed, in many cases the test edge has the form {|t|}K ⇒+ {|t′|}K , where K is a long-
term shared key and the uniquely originating value N is contained in both t and t′.
Frequently, t′ also contains a fresh session key. In these cases, we may regard the test
edge as an outgoing test or an incoming test; both de/nitions apply. The Otway–Rees
protocol is an example (Section 5.1). Below, we choose arbitrarily to regard it as an
outgoing test.
Protocols using symmetric cryptography that do not safeguard the secrecy of the
uniquely originating value may use a test edge that is either an outgoing test or an
incoming test (but not both). The edge is an outgoing test if the challenge value N
is transmitted encrypted and the interlocutor proves its presence by decrypting it. In
this case, the edge has the form {|t|}K ⇒+ N , where N ❁ t. We have not illustrated a
protocol of this kind here.
The edge is an incoming test if it has the form N ⇒+ {|t|}K , and Neuman–Stubblebine
illustrates this case (Section 5:2), as does the Woo–Lam protocol (Section 5.3).
An unsolicited test is the only way for a key server to authenticate the principals
that request a key from it. This is the primary (though not exclusive) reason why it
occurs in protocols using symmetric cryptography.
4.3. Proving the method for authentication correct
In this section we will justify our method for establishing authentication results. We
/rst prove Proposition 16, justifying our treatment of secrecy. We then prove theo-
rems establishing the three kinds of authentication test which so many protocols use.
Each authentication test establishes the existence of regular nodes, typically forming a
transforming edge (Section 4.3.2).
4.3.1. Keys available to the penetrator are penetrable
Proposition 17. Let C be a bundle with n∈C and term(n)=K . Then K ∈ P.
Proof. By Propositions 5 and 14, we may assume that C is normal and eFcient. We
argue by induction on the well-founded relation 4C. Our induction hypothesis is that,
for all n′≺Cn, term(n′)∈K implies term(n′)∈ P.
By Proposition 11, we may let (p;L) be a transformation path such that ‘(p)= n, K
originates at p1, and K ❁Li for all i with 16 i 6 |p|. If |p|=1 and n is a penetrator
node, then n is a K node, so K ∈KP. Otherwise, because C is normal and eFcient, p1
is not a penetrator node (which could only be a K node).
Since p1 is a regular node, there are regular nodes on p, and we may let p# be
the last regular node on p. Since C is normal and term(‘(p)) is an atomic term, the
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penetrator path
p# → · · · → ‘(p)
is a falling path; by Proposition 11 it traverses no D strand key edges.
By the induction hypothesis, each time p traverses a D strand s from ciphertext node
to plaintext node, then the key edge on s contains a key K0 ∈ P. By Proposition 7,
K ❁P−1L#, where L# is the distinguished component of p#. To show that K ∈ P, we
need only show that L# occurs new on some positive regular node.
Let $ be the least index such that Li =L# for all i for $6i6#. If p$ is a regular
node, then L# is a new component of p$ by the choice of $. However, if p$ is a
penetrator node, then it lies either on a D or on a E strand, either of which has a
simple node. However, by Proposition 15, this contradicts the assumption that C is
eFcient.
4.3.2. Proofs of the authentication tests
A regular component is a term that is a component of some regular node.
Proposition 18. Suppose (p;L) is a transformation path traversing no key edges
such that p1 and ‘(p) are regular and L1 =L|p|.
(1) Let L1 be of the form {|h1|}K1 . Suppose that L1 is not a proper subterm of any
regular component; and suppose that K−11 =∈ P. If  is the smallest index such that
L =L+1; then p is regular. Moreover; p⇒+ p+1 is a transforming edge.
(2) Let L|p| be of the form {|h#|}K# . Suppose that L|p| is not a proper subterm of any
regular component; and suppose that K# =∈ P. If  is the largest index such that
L =L−1; then p is regular. Moreover; p−1⇒+ p is a transforming edge.
Proof. We prove item (1). The proof of (2) is analogous. Suppose p is not regular.
Then p⇒+ p+1 lies either on a D-strand or an E-strand.
In the D-strand case term(p)= {|h1|}K1 . But then the key edge contains K−11 , which
by Proposition 17 entails K−11 ∈ P.
So suppose that p⇒+ p+1 lies on an E-strand, in which case L is a proper
subterm of L+1 = term(p+1). Since C is normal and p⇒+ p+1 is constructive,
every penetrator edge between p and the next regular node p on p, which exists
since ‘(p) is regular, is constructive.
By Proposition 6, the path p → · · · →p is rising, so L1 =L is a proper subterm
of L+1 which in turn is a subterm of term(p). This contradicts the assumption that
L1 is not a proper subterm of any regular component.
p⇒+ p+1 is a transforming edge because L+1 is a new component on the strand
of p+1.
Proposition 19. Let C be a normal bundle with n′ ∈C; and let n⇒+ n′ be an outgoing
test for a in t. Then there exist regular nodes m;m′ ∈C such that t is a component
of m and m⇒+ m′ is a transforming edge for a.
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Suppose in addition that a occurs only in component t1 = {|h1|}K1 of m′. Suppose
that t1 is not a proper subterm of any regular component; and suppose that K−11 =∈ P.
Then there is a negative regular node with t1 as a component.
Proof. Because n⇒+ n′ is a transformed edge for a, there is a new component t′ of n′
with a❁ t′. By Proposition 11, there is a transformation path (p;L) in C with p1 = n,
‘(p)= n′, L|p|= t′, and a❁Li for all i. Since t′ is new in n′, L1 = t′. In fact, because
a occurs in no component of n other than t, L1 = t. In particular, L1 =L|p|.
By the /rst part of Proposition 18, the smallest index  such that L =L+1 is
such that p is regular. Moreover, p⇒+ p+1 is a transforming edge. It follows that
t=L1 =L is a component of m=p. Consider now the additional assumptions on
the components of m′=p+1. Since L+1 is a component of term(m′) that contains a
as subterm and a occurs only in component t1 = {|h1|}K1 , L+1 = t1.
If t1 = t′, then n′ itself is a negative regular node with t1 as a component. Other-
wise, apply Proposition 18 again to conclude that smallest index ¿ + 1 such that
L =L+1 is such that p regular. Now t1 =L+1 =L is a component of p.
By the de/nitions, pi ⇒+ pi+1 is a transforming edge. We must show that pi is
regular. Let pj be the earliest regular node along p after pi+1, which exists because
‘(p) is a regular node after pi+1; pj is negative by the de/nition of path. The node
pj contains a component Lj in which a occurs. Since we have assumed that Li+1
is not a proper subterm of any regular component, Li+1 = a; so Li+1 = {|h|}K where
a❁ h. We claim that Lj =Li+1, and is thus the component t1.
For otherwise there is a transforming edge px ⇒px+1 after pi+1 and before pj; by
the choice of pj, this edge can only lie on a penetrator strand, which is thus either a
D-strand or an E-strand. Let px ⇒px+1 be the /rst such edge, so Lx = {|h|}K .
Suppose /rst that px ⇒px+1 lies on a D-strand. Since {|h|}K is a component of
term(px) and this is a D-strand, {|h|}K = term(px). But then K−1 ∈ P, contradicting an
assumption.
Suppose next that px ⇒px+1 lies on a E-strand, so {|h|}K is a proper subterm of
term(px+1). Since this is a constructive strand and C is a normal bundle, we may infer
(Proposition 6) that term(px+1) is a subterm of term(pj); so {|h|}K is a proper subterm
of some component of pj. Since pj is regular, this contradicts another assumption.
Proposition 20. Let C be a normal bundle with n′ ∈C; and let n⇒+ n′ be an incoming
test for a in t′. Then there exist regular nodes m;m′ ∈C such that t′ is a component
of m′ and m⇒+ m′ is a transforming edge for a.
Proof. By Proposition 11, there is a transformation path (p;L) in C with p1 = n,
‘(p)= n′, L|p|= t′, and a❁Li for all i. Since t′ is new in n′, L1 = t′. In particu-
lar, L1 =L|p|. By the second part of Proposition 18 , the largest index  such that
L =L−1 is such that p−1 is regular. Moreover, p−1⇒+ p is a transforming edge.
In particular t′=L|p|=L is a component of m′=p.
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Therefore there is a last i in p such that Li = t′. By the de/nitions, pi ⇒+ pi+1 is
a transforming edge. The proof that pi ⇒+ pi+1 is regular is dual to the proof of
Proposition ?; we must show that pi is regular.
Suppose otherwise: Then pi ⇒+ pi+1 lies either on a D-strand or an E-strand; in
either case term(pi+1)= t′= {|h|}K . But pi ⇒+ pi+1 cannot lie on a E-strand because
we have assumed that K =∈ P.
So suppose that pi ⇒+ pi+1 lies on an D-strand, in which case Li = {|t′|}K′ for some
key K ′. Since C is normal and pi ⇒+ pi+1 is destructive, every penetrator edge up to
pi starting at the previous regular node on p, if any exists, is destructive. Moreover,
there does exist a regular node pj, where 16j¡i, because p1 = n is regular. By
Proposition6, p traverses no key edges; hence (Proposition 6), pj → · · · →pi+1 is
falling, and {|t′|}K′ ❁ term(pj). But this contradicts the assumption (De/nition 1, Clause
2) that t′ is a test component.
Therefore pi is regular, and pi ⇒+ pi+1 is a regular transforming edge with t′ a
component of pi+1.
Proposition 21. Let C be a normal bundle with n∈C; and let n be an unsolicited
test for t= {|h|}K . Then there exists a positive regular node m∈C such that t is a
component of m.
Proof. By Proposition 11, there is a key edge free transformation path (p;L) in C
with p1 = n, ‘(p)= n′, L|p|= t, t❁Li for all i and such that t originates at p1. Since
t originates at p1, p1 is a positive node. We claim p1 is a regular node. Suppose
otherwise. Since t❁pk , pk is neither an M-node nor a K-node. Since t originates at
p1, p1 cannot be a S-node, a C-node nor a D-node.
If p1 is a E-node, then p1 is the positive ciphertext (last) node on a E-strand. Since
K =∈ P, t is a proper subterm of term(p1). Hence t is a subterm of the plaintext (/rst)
node on the strand, so t cannot originate at p1 in this case either.
Therefore, p1 must be a regular node as claimed. By the de/nition of test component,
t is not a proper subterm of any component of p1, so t is a component of p1.
We will construct a path p backwards. Let n1 = n; suppose that we have constructed
the path nk → · · · → n1, and that t❁ ni for each i.
5. Protocol correctness and protocol failure
In this section we apply the authentication theorems of Section 4.2 to several
additional examples. They are the Otway–Rees protocol [19, 1, 26], the Neuman–
Stubblebine protocol [18, 25], and the Woo–Lam protocol [27, 29]. We do so to il-
lustrate the ease and directness with which these theorems lead to authentication
results.
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Fig. 18. Message exchange in Otway–Rees.
It is remarkably easy to /nd the outgoing, incoming, and unsolicited tests that provide
a protocol’s authentication guarantees, assuming that the protocol does not allow its test
components to occur in nested contexts. That would violate Clause 2 of the de/nition
of test component (De/nition 13). The method works for public-key protocols, and for
shared symmetric key protocols also.
In the Otway–Rees protocol, each of the initiator and the responder uses an outgoing
test to authenticate a server strand. The server uses an unsolicited test to establish that
the initiator and responder have each sent a message.
The Neuman–Stubblebine protocol uses a combination of incoming tests and unso-
licited tests. It is a two-part protocol: in Part I the initiator and responder use a key
distribution server to authenticate one another and acquire a session key. In Part II the
key distribution server is not involved; the initiator re-presents a ticket obtained in a
run of Part I, and the initiator and responder re-authenticate one another. Part I is valid
in itself [25] (ignoring an implausible type-Iaw attack [11]. Part II is Iawed, both in
itself [11] and in undermining the guarantees that Part I provides in isolation [25]. We
will use the authentication test results to explain both why Part I works in isolation,
and also why the addition of Part II undermines its guarantees.
5.1. The Otway–Rees protocol
The Otway–Rees protocol (Fig. 18) uses long-term symmetric keys shared with a
key server to distribute a new session key for a conversation between two clients. The
protocol does not establish that the same key is delivered to both A and B [26], only
that if either A or B reaches the end of its strand, then the other has submitted the
expected matching original request {|Nb M AB|}KBS or {|Na M AB|}KAS . Also, K is not
disclosed, assuming that the server chooses a uniquely originating session key K .
364 J.D. Guttman, F.J. Thayer / Theoretical Computer Science 283 (2002) 333–380
5.1.1. Strand spaces for Otway–Rees
The regular strands are de/ned to be of the form:
(1) “Initiator strands” in Init[A; B; N;M; K], which have trace:
〈+M AB {|N M AB|}KAS ; −M {|N K |}KAS 〉:
(2) “Responder strands” in Resp[A; B; N;M; K; H; H ′], which have trace:
〈−M ABH; +M ABH {|N M AB|}KBS ; −M H ′ {|N K |}KBS ; +M H ′〉
(3) “Server strands” in Serv[A; B; Na; Nb;M; K] with trace:
〈−M AB {|Na M AB|}KAS {|Nb M AB|}KBS ; +M {|Na K |}KAS {|Nb K |}KBS 〉:
The principal active in Init[A; B; N;M; K] is A, while the active principal in Resp[A; B; N;
M; K; ∗∗] is B. 1 We de/ne LT to be the set of long-term keys, i.e. the range of
the injective function KAS for A∈ Tname. All long-terms keys are symmetrical: K ∈ LT
implies K =K−1.
We will use three side assumptions.
(1) We assume that the responder’s nonce originates on that strand, which implies that
Resp[A; B; N;M; K; H; H ′] = ∅ if N ❁H .
(2) We assume that the terms H and H ′, which are simply forwarded by the responder
with no interpretation or processing, contain no proper encrypted subterms. That
is, {|g|}K ❁H and {|g|}K =H implies
Resp[A; B; N;M; K; H; H ′] = ∅;
and likewise for H ′. We point out below (Section 5.1.3) that this assumption does
not mask any possible failure of the protocol.
(3) We assume that the server generates keys in a reasonable manner, in the sense that
Serv[∗∗; K] = ∅ unless: K =∈KP; K =K−1; K is uniquely originating; and K =∈ LT. It
follows from the unique origination assumption that the cardinality |Serv[∗∗; K]|61
for every K .
An assumption of the same form as (2) is always useful when a principal forwards
an encrypted component it cannot decrypt. An assumption of the same form as (3)
always characterizes the intended behavior of a key server. Let  be a strand space
satisfying these three conditions.
5.1.2. Otway–Rees authentication
Structurally, Otway–Rees achieves its authentication guarantees in three steps.
1 We sometimes use an asterisk to indicate a union over a particular argument position, and a double
asterisk to indicate a union over all remaining argument positions. Thus, for instance, Serv[∗; ∗; ∗; ∗; ∗; K] is
the set of all server strands emitting the session key K ; Resp[A; B; N;M; K; ∗∗] is the set of all responder
strands with initiator A, responder B, nonce N , round number M , session key K , and any value of the
remaining parameters. We will also abbreviate a form like Serv[∗; ∗; ∗; ∗; ∗; K] to Serv[∗∗; K].
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(1) The long-term keys LT are not disclosed by the protocol. Thus, if K ∈ LT and
K =∈KP, then K ∈S0. Hence, if the server distributes a session key K ′ to principals
with uncompromised keys, then K ′ ∈S1.
(2) The server strand receives an unsolicited test that authenticates the initial positive
node of the initiator and responder.
(3) The initiator strand contains an outgoing test for Na in {|Na M AB|}KAS ; this authen-
ticates the server strand. Likewise, the responder strand contains an outgoing test
for Nb in {|Nb M AB|}KBS , which authenticates the server strand.
The initiator authenticates the responder only in that it authenticates the server strand,
which has authenticated the occurrence of the responder’s initial positive node. The
situation is symmetrical for the responder authenticating the initiator.
Because K ❁ term(n) for long-term keys K ∈ LT and regular nodes n, De/nition 12
immediately entails LT⊂S0 ∪KP. Because the initiator and responder strands emit no
new components in which keys occur, a session key can be compromised only if
the server sends it out encrypted with a compromised long term key. By the unique
origination assumption on session keys, if it is sent out under uncompromised long
term keys, then the server will never re-use it with compromised long term keys.
Summarizing this, we have:
Proposition 22. LT⊂S0 ∪KP. If KAS ; KBS =∈KP and Serv[A; B; ∗; ∗; ∗; K] = ∅ then
K ∈S1.
Turning now to the server’s authentication guarantee, we use unsolicited tests.
Proposition 23. Suppose that C is a bundle in ; A =B; KAS ; KBS =∈KP; and s∈
Serv[A; B; Na; Nb;M; ∗] has C-height 1. Then there exist si ∈ Init[A; B; Na;M; ∗] and sr ∈
Resp[A; B; Nb;M; ∗∗] such that si has C-height 1 and sr has C-height 2.
Proof. The terms {|Na M AB|}KAS and {|Nb M AB|}KBS are unsolicited tests, and therefore
(Authentication Test 3) occur on positive regular nodes in C. When A =B, the latter
occurs positively only on a node 〈sr; 2〉 where sr ∈Resp[A; B; Nb;M; ∗∗].
As for {|Na M AB|}KAS , it may occur positively either on an initiator strand si ∈ Init[A;
B; Na;M; ∗] or as H or H ′ in a strand s′r ∈Resp[∗∗; H; ∗] or Resp[∗∗; H ′]. Let S be the set
of all regular nodes in C having {|Na M AB|}KAS as a component. Since
S is non-empty, it has a 4C-minimal member n0 (Proposition 27). Since neither H
nor H ′ occurs new on a responder strand, n0 can only be of the form 〈si; 1〉 for si ∈
Init[A; B; Na;M; ∗].
If A=B, then {|N M AB|}KAS = {|N M AB|}KBS , so the server can no longer be sure
that both an initiator strand and a responder strand are present. This is the explanation
for the odd attack, attributed to Michael Goldsmith, in which “the responder thinks he
wants to talk to himself, but he really doesn’t”.
(1) P(B)→B: BBM H ;
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(2) B→P(S): BBM H {|Nb M BB|}KBS ;
(3) P(B)→ S: BBM{|Nb M BB|}KBS {|Nb M BB|}KBS ,
which causes a normal server strand, despite the non-existence of any active initiator.
Proposition 24. Suppose that C is a bundle in ; A =B; KAS =∈KP; and si ∈ Init[A; B;
Na;M; K] has C-height 2. Then there exists s∈Serv[A; B; Na; ∗; M; K] with C-height 2.
Proof. 〈si; 1〉⇒+ 〈si; 2〉 is an outgoing test for Na in {|Na M AB|}KAS . Therefore there
is a regular transforming edge for Na (Authentication Test 1). By inspection, this can
only lie on a server strand s∈Serv[A; B; Na; ∗; M; K].
Proposition 25. Suppose that C is a bundle in ; A =B; KBS =∈KP; and sr ∈Resp[A; B;
Nb;M; K; ∗∗] has C-height 3. Then there exists s∈Serv[A; B; ∗; Nb;M; K] with C-
height 2.
Proof. 〈sr; 2〉⇒+ 〈sr; 3〉 is an outgoing test for Nb in {|Nb M AB|}KBS . Therefore there
is a regular transforming edge for Nb (Authentication Test 1). By inspection, this can
only lie on a server strand s∈Serv[A; B; ∗; Nb;M; K].
These three theorems exhaust the authentication that this protocol actually achieves.
Consider, for example, the initiator’s guarantee that the responder has been active
in a bundle C containing a strand si in Init[A; B; Na;M; K]. It follows from Proposi-
tion 24, which establishes that the bundle contains some s′ ∈Serv[A; B; Na; ∗; M; K], to-
gether with Proposition 23, which further shows that some sr ∈Resp[A; B; ∗; M; ∗∗] has
C-height 2. Observe that the Otway–Rees protocol cannot possibly guarantee that the
responder strand (even if completed) will receive the same session key [26].
5.1.3. The constraint on uninterpreted terms
In Section 5.1.1, we assumed (Clause 2) that the terms H and H ′ contain no en-
crypted proper subterms for a responder strand in Resp[A; B; N;M; K; H; H ′]. However,
the responder B cannot enforce this constraint, because in the intended case, these are
terms encrypted in A’s long-term key, which are unintelligible to B.
In this section we will check that this unenforceable constraint does not hide any
attacks. In particular, if the penetrator can succeed without our restrictive assumption,
then he can also succeed if it is in force.
To this end, we modify the speci/cation of the Otway–Rees protocol by remov-
ing the restriction in Clause 2 that the terms H and H ′ contain no encrypted proper
subterms. Let us call this new protocol “unconstrained Otway–Rees” to distinguish it
from the original protocol, which we will refer to (in this section only) as “constrained
Otway–Rees”. Note that any constrained Otway–Rees bundle is also an unconstrained
Otway–Rees bundle. We then show any unconstrained Otway–Rees bundle C′ is nearly
equivalent (in a sense de/ned below) to a constrained Otway–Rees bundle C.
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To facilitate the following discussion, we will refer to the locations of the H and H ′
subterms of Resp[A; B; N;M; K; H; H ′] nodes as insigni?cant locations and the terms at
those locations as insigni?cant terms.
Denition 16. A near equivalence of unconstrained Otway–Rees strand spaces C on
 and C′ on ′ is a bijection I from the regular nodes of C to those of C′ satisfying
(1) I preserves the strand structure, that is m⇒+ n if and only if I(m)⇒+I(n).
(2) For any regular node n∈C, term(n) and term(I(n)) are identical except for
insigni/cant locations of term(n) and term(I(n)).
(3) A simple term originates uniquely on regular nodes in  i) it originates uniquely
on regular nodes in ′.
This de/nition is clearly weaker than the notion of equivalence (De/nition 1) in that
the underlying strand spaces of the bundles may be di)erent. Moreover, for regular
nodes n and I(n), the corresponding terms term(n) and term(I(n)) may be di)erent.
Proposition 26. Any unconstrained Otway–Rees bundle C′ is nearly equivalent to a
constrained Otway–Rees bundle C.
Proof. Let H0; H ′0 ∈ T be /xed values, chosen so that neither originates uniquely in
′. Let  contain the same initiator and server strands as ′, and the same penetrator
strands, together with countably many M-strands emitting the term H0 and countably
many M-strands emitting the term H ′0. Let the responder strands of  be synthesized
from those of ′ be replacing the values of the parameters H and H ′ by H0 and
H ′0; hence we have a bijection correlating the strands of Resp[A; B; Nb;M; K; ∗∗] in ′
and Resp[A; B; Nb;M; K; H0; H ′0] in . By the way we selected H0 and H
′
0,  satis/es
Clause 2.
A term t is uniquely originates on a regular strand in ′ i) it uniquely originates
on a regular strand in ; likewise, the two strand spaces have the same value for
KP. Hence, clauses 1 and 3 are also satis/ed, so  satis/es all the conditions for an
Otway–Rees strand space.
We may now synthesize a bundle C in  from C′. We include the same initia-
tor, server, and penetrator strands (with the same height). For each responder strand in
Resp[A; B; Nb;M; K; H; H ′] contained in C′, we include the correlated strand in
Resp[A; B; Nb;M; K; H0; H ′0], with the same height. We cannot connect these strands
directly to the expected sender or recipient, because they require H0 in place of H and
H ′0 in place of H
′. However, we may use M-strands to emit the newly required values,
and S- and C-strands to splice them in the required positions. Similarly, we use S- and
C-strands to splice them out again and re-insert the values used in C′ between each
responder strand and the rest of the bundle. The resulting bundle C is a counterexample
to the same property in , because these properties are independent of the values of
H;H ′ occurring in their responder strands. The other regular strands are unchanged.
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Fig. 19. Neuman–Stubblebine Part I (authentication).
Hence we may conclude that a strand space ′ satis/es the same authentication
properties, even if Clause 2 fails in ′.
This technique may be applied more generally to prove authentication results for
protocols which contain unconstrained terms. Suppose  is strand space in which the
regular strands are given as traces in parametric form term
P[(; A˜; H ] = 〈P1[(; A˜; H ]; : : : ;Pn[(; A˜; H ]〉;
where A˜ and H range over terms and ( indicates a protocol role such as server or
responder. Assume further that
(1) for each i; H occurs only as a component of the term Pi[(; A˜; H ],
(2) H is allowed to assume any value in the message algebra.
Under these hypotheses, to prove any authentication results we may impose the follow-
ing constraint on H : H ∈T and H does not occur anywhere else on regular strands.
5.2. Neuman–Stubblebine
The Neuman–Stubblebine protocol [18] contains two sub-protocols. We will call the
/rst sub-protocol the authentication protocol and the second sub-protocol the
re-authentication protocol. In the authentication sub-protocol, a key distribution center
generates a session key for an initiator (a network client) and a responder (a network
server); the message exchange is shown in Fig. 19. This session key is embedded in
encrypted form in a re-usable ticket of the form {|AK T |}KBS .
Strands of the form shown in the columns labelled A, B, and S in Fig. 19 will
be called Init[A; B; Na; Nb; tb; K; H ], Resp[A; B; Na; Nb; tb; K], and Serv[A; B; Na; Nb; tb; K],
respectively.
As in Section 5.1, we de/ne LT to be the set of long-term keys, i.e. the range of
the injective function KAS for A∈ Tname. All long-terms keys are symmetrical: K ∈ LT
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Fig. 20. Neuman–Stubblebine, Part II (re-authentication).
implies K =K−1. We likewise assume that the server generates keys in a reasonable
way, meaning that that Serv[∗∗; K] = ∅ unless: K =∈KP; K =K−1; K is uniquely orig-
inating; and K =∈ LT. Because of the unique origination assumption, it follows that the
cardinality |Serv[∗∗; K]|6 1 for every K .
The overall strategy for showing the responder’s guarantee, assuming given a strand
sr ∈Resp[A; B; Na; Nb; tb; K] with KAS ; KBS =∈KP, is the following:
(1) As with Otway–Rees, LT ⊂ S0 ∪KP. So for all K ′, K ′ ∈S1 whenever Serv[A; B; ∗; ∗;
∗; K ′] = ∅.
(2) {|AK tb|}KBS is an unsolicited test, originating on a regular strand. This can only be
a server strand ss ∈Serv[A; B; ∗; ∗; tb; K]. Therefore K ∈S1.
(3) M2⇒M4 is an incoming test for Nb in {|Nb|}K . Hence there is a regular transforming
edge producing {|Nb|}K . This can lie only on the second and third nodes of an
initiator strand si ∈ Init[A′; B′; N ′a ; Nb; t′b; K; ∗].
(4) Since 〈si; 2〉 contains {|B′ N ′a K t′b|}KA′S and K ∈S1, it follows that K−1A′S =∈ P. More-
over K−1A′S =KA′S .
So {|B′ N ′a K t′b|}KA′S is an unsolicited test, originating on a regular strand. This
can only be a server strand s′s ∈Serv[A′; B′; N ′a ; ∗; t′b; K].
(5) Since server strands construct uniquely originating keys, and K originates on both
ss and s′s, it follows that ss = s
′
s. Hence, A
′=A, B′=B, and t′b = tb. Therefore,
si ∈ Init[A; B; ∗; Nb; tb; K; ∗], and this strand has height at least three.
The initiator’s guarantee is simpler to establish. The edge M1⇒M3 on an initiator
strand is an incoming test for Na in {|BNa K tb|}KAS . It shows there is a server strand
ss ∈Serv[A; B; Na; ∗; tb; K]. The /rst node of ss is an unsolicited test, showing the exis-
tence of a responder strand sr ∈Resp[A; B; Na; ∗; tb; ∗].
In the re-authentication sub-protocol, the key distribution center no longer needs to
be involved; the initiator again presents the same ticket to the responder, as shown
in Fig. 20. However, in the presence of this additional sub-protocol, step 3 in the
responder’s guarantee can no longer be completed. There is certainly still a transforming
edge producing {|Nb|}K , but this edge may lie either on an initiator strand for Part I
of the protocol, or on (conceivably) either type of strand for Part II. By contrast, the
initiator’s guarantee for Part I is una)ected, because we have not added any strand
with a transforming edge producing a term of the form {|BNa K tb|}KAS .
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Fig. 21. Woo–Lam.
5.3. The Woo–Lam protocol
The Woo–Lam one-way authentication protocol [27] also uses an incoming test,
although in a Iawed way [29, 4, 8]. It is intended to allow an initiator (client) A to
authenticate his presence to a responder (networked service) B, by means of long-term
keys shared with a key server. A receives no authenticating information about B. The
behavior of the protocol is given in Fig. 21.
It is clear from Fig. 21 how this is intended to work. The ⇒+ edge from B’s /rst
transmission of Nb to its /nal reception of {|Nb|}KBS is intended to serve as an incoming
test with that term as test component. The server’s edge {|A; {|Nb|}KAS |}KBS ⇒{|Nb|}KBS is
intended as the corresponding transforming edge. It “authenticates” that the server has
found Nb inside A’s encrypted message.
Unfortunately, this description is enough to see what is wrong with this protocol.
There is another type of transforming edge that produces a term of the same form
as the incoming test component. This is the initiator’s encrypting edge, in the case in
which the initiator is B. Thus, the attacker can wait until B needs to authenticate itself
to any responder, and can then execute the attack shown in Fig. 22. Woo and Lam
state that they assume that a principal can detect when it receives an encrypted unit
that it has constructed itself; so perhaps this attack is not entirely “fair”. See Clark and
Jacob [4] for additional discussion.
Yet another problem (also discussed in [4]) exists. Even when the server constructs
the term {|Nb|}KBS , this term does not fully determine the parameters to the server strand.
A second attack on Woo–Lam exploits this. The attacker starts two sessions with the
responder B. In one he purports to be A; in the other he uses some identity C he has
somehow captured, so that KCS ∈KP. He then switches the nonce Nb that B generates,
intended to authenticate A, into the session with C, so that B sends {|C; {|Nb|}KCS |}KBS
to the server. The server then generates {|Nb|}KBS , which is the test component for B’s
session with A. The attacker then makes this appear to belong to that session. The
auxiliary session with C fails to complete.
The Woo–Lam example is included here to illustrate how useful the authentication
tests are as a heuristic used to /nd problems in protocols. They may be used for this
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Fig. 22. Woo–Lam in/ltrated.
purpose even in a case in which some of the oFcial constraints on the authentica-
tion test are not satis/ed. For instance, in the Woo–Lam protocol, the test component
{|Nb|}KBS could also occur as a proper subterm of a regular node, namely the mes-
sage from a responder to the server. However, the authentication tests still model the
reasoning of a protocol designer well enough to suggest where failures will lie.
6. Cryptographic protocol design
The outgoing, incoming, and unsolicited tests, and the authentication results that
apply to them, suggest a protocol design process. At our level of abstraction, au-
thentication protocol design is largely a matter of selecting authentication tests, and
constructing a unique regular transforming edge to satisfy each. 2 We will illustrate
this process by an example, leading to a protocol akin to Carlsen’s [2] protocol.
6.1. An example design process
In this example, we aim to modify the Otway–Rees protocol (Fig. 18) in two ways.
First, we imagine a situation in which the principals A; B have very limited crypto-
graphic power. Thus, we would like to avoid encrypting both the initial requests and
the server’s response. Since the latter must be encrypted (to protect the con/dentiality
of the session key), we will not encrypt the original requests. Instead of using outgoing
tests, like Otway–Rees, this new protocol will use incoming tests, because they do not
require the initial request to be encrypted.
2 Of course, at other levels of abstraction there are other issues, concerning how to negotiate cryptographic
algorithms, how to evaluate whether cryptography has been used safely, how to format messages, how to
distribute certi/cates, how to align key streams, and so on, that are not considered at the current level of
abstraction.
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Fig. 23. Shape of the new protocol.
Second, the new protocol is intended to assure each principal that the other is in pos-
session of the same session key, which Otway–Rees does not achieve (Section 5.1.2).
To do so, we will also use incoming tests in which each principal answers a chal-
lenge, using the session key to encrypt the challenge value presented by the other
principal.
We will /rst describe the shape of the new protocol: It will extend the shape
of Otway–Rees as needed to include the /nal challenges and response, as shown in
Fig. 23. A’s challenge to B may be presented on the transmission 1→ 1, and B’s
response may be returned on 4→ 2, so this does not require any change to the shape.
We will have B present his challenge to A on 4→ 2, and B answer the challenge on
3→ 5. Adding this message is the only change we need to make to the shape of the
protocol.
A must generate a nonce Na at 1, which will be transformed by the server on
the edge ,1⇒ ,2. At node ,2, this nonce must be embedded in the same encrypted
component tA1 as the session key; this will authenticate to A that the server has generated
the session key K .
Also, A must generate a nonce at 1 for B’s use in demonstrating possession of K .
B will transform it along 3⇒ 4, emitting it within an encrypted component tA2 to
satisfy A’s second test. We prefer to use the same nonce Na here too, to save A the
computation required to generate another, and we will need to check that this sharing
will not invalidate any assumption of the authentication test results.
B must likewise generate a nonce Nb at 2, to be transformed by the server along
the edge ,1⇒ ,2, producing an encrypted term tB1 . This same nonce may also be
transmitted to A to be transformed along 2⇒ 3. A uses the session key K to produce
an encrypted component tB2 containing Nb.
Hence, we may /ll in some of the components that must be transmitted over the
di)erent arrows, as tabulated in Fig. 24. We include the names of the principals A and
B on arrows 1→ 1 and 2→ ,1, as a practical necessity so that the recipients have a
clue who is making the request. At node 2, both of A’s incoming tests are complete,
so at this point, A has received all his authentication guarantees.
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Fig. 24. Important components within the new protocol.
We must now de/ne the four test components tAi ; t
B
i for i=1; 2. t
A
1 must guarantee
to A that the key server has generated K in response to Na, and for use by A and B.
Therefore tA1 must take a form such as {| : : : Na BK |}KA ; the key KA identi/es this as a
component constructed on behalf of A.
For a similar reason, tB1 must take a form such as {| : : : Nb AK |}KB . We want to ensure
that tA1 and t
B
1 are of di)erent forms; to do so we select two distinct text values, to
which we will refer using the constants cI and cR, de/ning the /rst test components
tA1 = {|cI Na BK |}KA and tB1 = {|cR Nb AK |}KB :
Turning now to the second authentication test for each participant, we need only that
the nonces Na, Nb be encrypted with the session key K , and that the test components
take distinct forms. Hence we may choose
tA2 = {|cI Na|}K and tB2 = {|cR Nb|}K :
We have now selected the complete message structure for the protocol.
6.2. Security goals of the new protocol
Informally, the protocol appears to achieve the following: The initiator A and re-
sponder B receive a fresh session key K from a trusted key server. They share it
between themselves without disclosing it to any other party. Each learns that the other
has proceeded far enough in the protocol to have received the session key.
Let us represent strands with the trace represented in Fig. 24 in the column marked A
as Init[A; B; Na; K; Nb]; those with the trace shown in column B as Resp[A; B; Na; Nb; K];
and those with the trace shown in column S as Serv[A; B; Na; Nb; K].
Next, let us make the goals more rigorous. Suppose that C is a bundle for the
protocol, and suppose KA; KB =∈KP.
(1) Authenticating the server:
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Fig. 25. Carlsen’s protocol.
(a) If si ∈ Init[A; B; Na; K; ∗] has C-height 2, then there exists ss ∈Serv[A; B; Na;
∗; K] of C-height 2.
(b) If sr ∈Resp[A; B; ∗; Nb; K] has C-height 3, then there exists ss ∈Serv[A; B; ∗; Nb;
K] of C-height 2.
These conditions say that if the initiator reaches node 2 (or the responder reaches
3), then the server has a run that matches in principals, nonce, and session key.
Goal 1a is achieved by the incoming test on the edge 1⇒ 2 with test component
tA1 , and Goal 1b is achieved by the incoming test on the edge 2⇒ 3 with test
component tB1 .
(2) Session key secrecy: If ss ∈Serv[A; B; ∗; ∗; K] has C-height 2, then K ∈S1. This
requires the same assumption about server behavior that we used in Section 5.1.1,
Clause 3, and again in Section 5.2.
(3) Authenticating the interlocutor:
(a) If si ∈ Init[A; B; Na; K; ∗] has C-height 2, then there exists sr ∈Resp[A; B; Na;
∗; K] of C-height 4.
(b) If sr ∈Resp[A; B; Na; Nb; K] has C-height 5, then there exists si ∈ Init[A; B; Na;
K; Nb] of C-height 3.
These two statements assert that the principals’ use of K to encrypt Na and Nb
shows them that each agrees on the other’s identity, as well as the session key and
the nonces. Goal 3a is achieved by the incoming test on the edge 1⇒ 2 with test
component tA2 , and Goal 3b is achieved by the incoming test on the edge 2⇒ 5
with test component tB2 .
The check that the incoming tests achieve the corresponding goals is routine using
the incoming authentication test result. The new protocol is very similar to Carlsen’s
(Fig. 25). The di)erences between Carlsen’s protocol and our new one are that we
decided to reuse Nb for the responder’s second test; we decided to distinguish the /rst
test components using di)erent constants rather than di)erent orderings; and we chose
to distinguish the forms of the second test components. Of these contrasts, only the last
makes any noticeable di)erence. It simpli/es our proof of each principal’s guarantee
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that the other has received the session key, although a careful argument shows that
the same property is also achieved by Carlsen’s protocol. However, neither Carlsen’s
protocol nor ours gives the key server any authentication guarantee whatever, because
ANa BNb does not contain an unsolicited test.
The authentication tests seem to us to serve quite nicely as a design concept, allowing
a designer to change a protocol to reallocate cryptographic burden while achieving the
intended security goals.
6.3. Summary: protocol correctness
Having completed a design process, there are /ve questions that need to be answered
in order to ensure that the resulting protocol has achieved its security goals:
(1) Is the set of penetrable keys P disjoint from the decryption keys for outgoing
components, and disjoint from the encryption keys for incoming and unsolicited
components?
(2) Is any test component a proper subterm of a component of term(n) for any regular
node n?
(3) Are there ever two types of transforming edge that transform the same outgoing
component, or produce the same incoming component?
(4) Do the parameters contained in the test components completely determine the data
values contained in the desired authentication guarantee?
(5) If a data value is intended to remain secret, is it always protected by at least one
key K whose corresponding decryption key K−1 is not penetrable?
The /rst two questions must be answered aFrmatively to apply Authentication Tests
1–3, which then entail that there exist matching regular transforming edges.
But must those regular transforming edges lie on the strands that we expect them
to (Question 3)? A common cause of authentication failure arises when there is also
another edge that can transform the same value (e.g. Neuman–Stubblebine with re-
authentication and Woo–Lam). Alternatively, we may know that a transforming edge
of the kind desired is present, but it may not determine all of the parameters that we
would like to agree on (Question 4). This was the reason for the failure of the original
Needham–Schroeder protocol, and for the second Woo–Lam failure.
If the third and fourth questions are answered aFrmatively, then the authentication
goals of the protocol will have been met. Finally, Question 5 assures that the protocol’s
secrecy goals will also be met.
Protocol designers need to be alert when Questions 3 and 4 receive negative answers.
Then there are unintended services, situations in which the protocol itself o)ers a
transformation that can be abused by the penetrator. We recommend that protocol
designers, even when working without any formal framework, ask themselves whether
their protocols o)er any unintended services to assist the penetrator in achieving what
the protocol regards as establishing authentication. Unintended services are easy to
recognize, and they are a strong clue where an attack on a protocol may lie.
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Appendix A. Strands, bundles, and the penetrator
In this appendix, we de/ne the basic strand space notions used in the body of the
paper. This material is derived from Thayer et al. [26], with a few small changes. For
instance, the penetrator strands of type T (which duplicated a value for two receivers)
and F (which Iushed a value) were unnecessary. A positive node may be gregarious,
having multiple out-arrows, which makes T strands unnecessary; a positive node may
be lonely, having no out-arrows, which makes F strands unnecessary. Eliminating them
from De/nition 23 leads to a more symmetrical set of penetrator behaviors, simplifying
normalization and other graph operations on bundles.
A.1. Strand spaces
Consider a set A, the elements of which are the possible messages that can be
exchanged between principals in a protocol. We will refer to the elements of A as
terms. We assume that a subterm relation is de/ned on A. t0❁ t1 means t0 is a subterm
of t1. We constrain the set A further below in Section A.3, and de/ne a subterm relation
there.
In a protocol, principals can either send or receive terms. We represent transmission
of a term as the occurrence of that term with positive sign, and reception of a term as
its occurrence with negative sign.
Denition A.1. A signed term is a pair 〈,; a〉 with a∈A and , one of the symbols
+;−. We will write a signed term as +t or −t. (±A)∗ is the set of /nite sequences
of signed terms. We will denote a typical element of (±A)∗ by 〈〈,1; a1〉; : : : ; 〈,n; an〉〉.
A strand space over A is a set  together with a trace mapping tr :→ (±A)∗.
By abuse of language, we will still treat signed terms as ordinary terms. For instance,
we shall refer to subterms of signed terms. We will usually represent a strand space
by its underlying set of strands .
Denition A.2. Fix a strand space .
(1) A node is a pair 〈s; i〉, with s∈ and i an integer satisfying 16 i 6 length(tr(s)).
The set of nodes is denoted by N. We will say the node 〈s; i〉 belongs to the strand
s. Clearly, every node belongs to a unique strand.
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(2) If n= 〈s; i〉 ∈N then index(n)= i and strand(n)= s. De/ne term(n) to be (tr(s))i,
i.e. the ith signed term in the trace of s. Similarly, uns term(n) is ((tr(s))i)2, i.e.
the unsigned part of the ith signed term in the trace of s.
(3) There is an edge n1→ n2 if and only if term(n1)=+a and term(n2)=−a for
some a∈A. Intuitively, the edge means that node n1 sends the message a, which
is received by n2, recording a potential causal link between those strands.
(4) When n1 = 〈s; i〉 and n2 = 〈s; i + 1〉 are members of N, there is an edge n1⇒ n2.
Intuitively, the edge expresses that n1 is an immediate causal predecessor of n2
on the strand s. We write n′⇒+ n to mean that n′ precedes n (not necessarily
immediately) on the same strand.
(5) An unsigned term t occurs in n∈N i) t❁ term(n).
(6) Suppose I is a set of unsigned terms. The node n∈N is an entry point for I i)
term(n)= + t for some t ∈ I , and whenever n′⇒+ n; term(n′) =∈ I .
(7) An unsigned term t originates on n∈N i) n is an entry point for the set I={t′: t❁ t′}.
(8) An unsigned term t is uniquely originating i) t originates on a unique n∈N.
If a term t originates uniquely in a particular strand space, then it can play the role
of a nonce or session key in that structure.
N together with both sets of edges n1→ n2 and n1⇒ n2 is a directed graph 〈N; (→
∪⇒)〉.
A.2. Bundles and causal precedence
A bundle is a /nite subgraph of the graph 〈N; (→∪⇒)〉, for which we can regard
the edges as expressing the causal dependencies of the nodes.
Denition A.3. Suppose →C⊂→; suppose ⇒C⊂⇒; and suppose C= 〈NC; (→C ∪
⇒C)〉 is a subgraph of 〈N; (→∪⇒)〉. C is a bundle if:
(1) NC and →C∪ ⇒C are /nite.
(2) If n2 ∈NC and term(n2) is negative; then there is a unique n1 such that n1→Cn2.
(3) If n2 ∈NC and n1⇒ n2 then n1⇒Cn2.
(4) C is acyclic.
In conditions (2) and (3), it follows that n1 ∈NC, because C is a graph.
For our purposes, it does not matter whether communication is regarded as a syn-
chronizing event or as an asynchronous activity. The de/nition of bundle formalizes a
process communication model with three properties:
• A strand (process) may send and receive messages, but not both at the same time;
• When a strand receives a message t, there is a unique node transmitting t from which
the message was immediately received;
• When a strand transmits a message t, many strands may immediately receive t.
Notational Convention A.1. A node n is in a bundle C= 〈NC;→C∪⇒C〉; written n∈C;
if n∈NC; a strand s is in C if all of its nodes are in NC. If C is a bundle; then the
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C-height of a strand s is the largest i such that 〈s; i〉 ∈C. C-trace(s)
= 〈tr(s)(1); : : : ; tr(s)(m)〉; where m=C-height(s).
Denition A.4. If S is a set of edges, i.e. S⊂→∪⇒, then ≺S is the transitive closure
of S; and 4S is the reIexive, transitive closure of S.
The relations ≺S and 4S are each subsets of NS×NS, where NS is the set of
nodes incident with any edge in S.
Proposition A.5. Suppose C is a bundle. Then 4C is a partial order; i.e. a re@exive;
antisymmetric; transitive relation. Every non-empty subset of the nodes in C has 4C-
minimal members.
We regard 4C as expressing causal precedence, because n≺S n′ holds only when n’s
occurrence causally contributes to the occurrence of n′. When a bundle C is understood,
we will simply write 4. Similarly, “minimal” will mean 4C-minimal.
A.3. Terms, encryption, and freeness assumptions
We will now specialize the set of terms A. In particular we will assume given:
• A set T⊆A of texts (representing the atomic messages).
• A set K⊆A of cryptographic keys disjoint from T, equipped with a unary operator
inv :K→K . We assume that inv is an inverse mapping each member of a key pair
for an asymmetric cryptosystem to the other, and each symmetric key to itself.
• Two binary operators encr :K ×A→A and join :A×A→A.
We follow custom and write inv(K) as K−1; encr(K;m) as {|m|}K , and join(a; b) as a b.
If K is a set of keys, K−1 denotes the set of inverses of elements of K. We assume,
like many others (e.g. [14, 16, 20]), that A is freely generated, which is crucial for the
results in this paper.
Axiom A.1. A is freely generated from T and K by encr and join.
Denition A.6. The subterm relation ❁ is de/ned inductively; as the smallest relation
such that a❁ a; a❁ {|g|}K if a❁ g; and a❁ g h if a❁ g or a❁ h.
g is a proper subterm of h if g❁ h and g = h.
By this de/nition, for K ∈K , we have K ❁ {|g|}K only if K ❁ g already.
Denition A.7. (1) If K⊂K; then t0 ❁ K t if t is in the smallest set containing t0 and
closed under encryption with K ∈K and concatenation with arbitrary terms t1.
(2) A term t0 is a visible subterm of t if t0❁∅ t.
(3) A term t is simple if it is not of the form g h.
(4) A term t0 is a component of t if t0 is simple and t0❁∅ t.
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We say that t0 is a component of a node n if t0 is a component of term(n).
A.4. Penetrator strands
The atomic actions available to the penetrator are encoded in a set of penetra-
tor traces. They summarize his ability togenerate known messages, piece messages
together, and apply cryptographic operations using keys that become available to him.
A protocol attack typically requires hooking together several of these atomic actions.
The actions available to the penetrator are relative to the set of keys that the pene-
trator knows initially. We encode this in a parameter, the set of penetrator keys KP.
Denition A.8. A penetrator trace relative to KP is one of the following:
Mt Text message: 〈+t〉 where t ∈T:
KK Key: 〈+K〉 where K ∈KP:
Cg; h Concatenation: 〈−g; −h; +g h〉
Sg; h Separation: 〈−g h; +g; +h〉
Eh;K Encryption: 〈−K; −h; +{|h|}K〉.
Dh;K Decryption: 〈−K−1; −{|h|}K ; +h〉.
P is the set of all strands s∈ such that tr(s) is a penetrator trace.
A strand s∈ is a penetrator strand if it belongs to P; and a node is a penetrator
node if the strand it lies on is a penetrator strand. Otherwise we will call it a non-
penetrator or regular strand or node. A node n is M, K, etc. node if n lies on a
penetrator strand with a trace of kind M, K, etc.
We assume that all strand spaces have an adequate supply of C, S, E, and D strands;
by contrast, M and K strands vary, thus modeling the set of values the penetrator may
know or be able to guess.
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